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Abstract
Dynamic Random Subjective Expected Utility (DR-SEU) allows to model choice
data observed from an agent or a population of agents whose beliefs about objective
payoff-relevant states and tastes can both evolve stochastically. Our observable, the
augmented Stochastic Choice Function (aSCF) allows, in contrast to previous work
in decision theory, for a direct test of whether the agents’ beliefs reflect the true data-
generating process conditional on their private information as well as identification
of the possibly incorrect beliefs. We give an axiomatic characterization of when
an agent satisfies the model, both in a static (R-SEU) as well as in a dynamic
setting (DR-SEU). We look at the case when the agent has correct beliefs about the
evolution of objective states, as well as at the case when her beliefs are incorrect
but unforeseen contingencies are impossible.
We also distinguish in some detail two sub-variants of the dynamic model which
coincide in the static setting: Evolving SEU, where a sophisticated agent’s utility
evolves according to a Bellman equation and Gradual Learning, where the agent is
learning about her taste over time. We prove easy and natural comparative static
results on the degree of belief incorrectness as well as on the speed of learning about
taste.
Auxiliary results contained in the online appendix extend previous decision the-
ory work in the menu choice and stochastic choice literature from a technical as well
as a conceptual perspective.
1 Introduction
The study of stochastic choice has found renewed popularity in economics. Along with a
considerable amount of research on static stochastic choice models, several recent works
have pioneered foundational work into dynamic stochastic choice models.1 In a dynamic
setting the agent solves a dynamic decision problem and learns as time passes about
either the environment she is facing or her own evolution of preferences or both. In many
applications an analyst only observes choices of an agent as well as some (possibly public)
signals about payoff-relevant objective states. He doesn’t have information about the
stochastic process of the preferences of the agent (the private information of the agent).
∗duraj@g.harvard.edu, Acknowledgments: I am indebted to Drew Fudenberg and Tomasz Strzalecki
for their continuous encouragement and support in this project. I thank Jerry Green, Kevin He, Eric
Maskin and Nicola Rosaia for numerous comments during different stages of this project. I also thank
Arjada Bardhi, Krishna Dasaratha, Ryota Iijima, Jonathan Libgober, Jay Lu, Maria Voronina and the
audience of Games and Markets at Harvard for their helpful comments. Any errors are mine.
1[Fudenberg, Strzalecki ’15], [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17], [Steiner, Stewart, Matejka ’17] to name a
few.
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In this paper we consider such a general environment: there are payoff-relevant ob-
jective states every period, an agent has every period standard subjective expected utility
(SEU) preferences, comprised of beliefs about the objective, payoff-relevant state as well
as a Bernoulli utility over a set of prizes. The subjective state of an agent in each period
consists of her realized SEU. We assume that these follow an exogenously given stochastic
process which is well-known to the agent (albeit unknown to the analyst). We assume
the agent can’t influence the given stochastic process and allow for both stochastic tastes
and stochastic beliefs. In many real life examples this two-fold randomness is present, e.g.
investment and saving behavior may depend both on exogenous, objective randomness
such as market conditions as well as on the stochastic evolution of the risk aversion of the
agent.
We assume that after each history of choices and realizations of the objective states the
analyst observes limiting frequencies of the choice of the agent in decision problems/menus
of the current period as well as the realization of the objective states in the current period.
The data also reflect variation of the decision problems/menus. Thus, the observable is in
every period, after each history of choices and objective states, a probability distribution
over choices from a menu in the current period and over realizations of the objective
state.2 Many situations in real life deliver such data, from employment situations in the
labor market, consumption and investment decisions, to educational choices of students,
loan practices, etc.3
Our focus is axiomatic throughout. Under the assumption that the distribution of
the private information of the agent doesn’t depend on the decision problem she faces
and that the analyst has access to a rich observable featuring variation in the decision
problems, we give conditions on the observable which allow the analyst to uncover the
distribution of the private information of the agent regardless of its arbitrariness. Under
these conditions the analyst can also study whether the agent’s beliefs when making
choices reflect the correct data-generating process conditional on her private information
and whenever that is not the case he can identify the biases conditional on the agent’s
private information. While the study of misspecified learning is not new, this is the first
work, to the best of knowledge, where there are no a priori assumptions on the origin
of the misspecification. The misspecified beliefs may be because of misspecified priors,
because of imprecise observation of private signals by the agent or because conditional on
her private information the agent has some arbitrary behavioral biases in beliefs.4
The model we consider is still falsifiable as we require the agent to be Bayesian with
respect to the stochastic process describing the evolution of her private information, even
though she may be non-Bayesian with respect to the true data generating process of
the objective states. Moreover, we don’t allow any misspecified learner to receive hard
evidence about misspecification, such as the occurrence of an unforeseen contingency.
Thus, in this paper the agent is able to explain any observed string of objective states
within her model, even though as time passes her beliefs might diverge more and more
2Our identification results are valid under more general conditions – see Remark 1 in section 2.
3This type of data also allows an alternative heterogeneous population interpretation: there is a
population of agents facing similar choice situations. The analyst observes in many instances the choice
of an agent as well as the realization of some payoff-relevant objective state. We focus on the single-agent
case in the exposition, but intuitions and results can be readily translated.
4E.g. this model allows for the case of confirmatory bias studied in [Rabin, Schrag ’99] where an
agent may misread signals in a way favorable to her current hypothesis. The agent in their model is not
Bayesian with respect to the correct prior but is so within her model.
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from the true data-generating process.5
The richer observable allows comparative static results about the degree of biasedness
of beliefs. We show how an analyst can use the data to construct a precise estimator of the
extent of the belief biasedness of the agent and how he can compare different agents using
this estimator. Moreover, since our model allows for both stochastic taste and beliefs, we
show what an analyst can say about the relative speed with which two different agents
learn their taste, given their respective datasets.
This paper is most related to [Lu ’16] – who studies the same static model but with
unobservable objective states, and [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17] – who study a fully non-
parametric dynamic model as here but without payoff-relevant objective states. Relat-
edly, [Dillenberger et al ’14] study the ex-ante menu preference of the agent modeled by
[Lu ’16]. Among other things we extend their work to allow for stochastic taste.6 Con-
ceptually the paper is also related to [Lu ’17] who shows how a combination of ex-ante
preference over acts and post-signal random choice can overcome the classical issue of
identification in the Expected State-dependent Utility model. Our model illustrates the
strong identification properties of random choice data for the case of state-independent
utilities in a rich dynamic environment allowing for stochastic taste. Finally, the observ-
able in this paper can be interpreted as a likelihood function of a dynamic choice model
in the spirit of [Rust ’87] and the literature that it inspired.7 Whereas that literature has
focused on identification and inference of controlled stochastic processes, this paper offers
an axiomatic treatment of such likelihood functions for choice behavior in a general set
up with both observable and unobservable states.
In the following we explain in detail the organization of the paper mentioning its
contribution at each step.
Section 2 focuses on the static model. For each decision problem A an analyst observes
the frequency of an agent’s choice and the realization of a payoff-relevant objective state
s (we say agent picks act f from menu A and objective state s is realized with a certain
probability ρ(f, A, s)). We call this observable an augmented stochastic choice function
(aSCF). We show how the analyst can identify from this observable the space of the
subjective states of the agent. We call this the revealed subjective support of the data.
We impose axioms similar to the ones in [Lu ’16] to ensure that the revealed subjective
support consists of SEUs that are identified by a belief q about the realization of s as well
as a Bernoulli utility u. Furthermore, we show how the analyst can use the concept of the
revealed subjective support to test whether the agent is using the correct data-generating
process of objective states, conditional on her private information. This corresponds to
the classical statistical concept of well-calibrated beliefs originating in [Dawid ’82] but
now in a general setting which allows for stochastic taste. Intuitively, an agent has
correct interim beliefs only if the observed frequency of the realization of s conditional on
observing f chosen from A is a mixture of beliefs in the subjective support of the data
which can rationalize the choice of f from A.8 Whenever this condition fails the analyst
5The time horizon is assumed to be finite. Thus the agent cannot resort to statistical tests of arbitrary
accuracy to determine that her beliefs might indeed be misspecified.
6Our proofs modify and extend the proofs of [Lu ’16] and [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17] in multiple
directions as well as extending several other models in the literature. E.g. we extend [Ahn, Sarver ’13]
to include objective states and stochastic beliefs. Details are in the online appendix.
7See [Rust ’94] and [Aricidiacono, Ellickson ’11] for surveys on the dynamic discrete choice literature.
8The last section of [Lu ’16] also studies the property of well-calibrated beliefs but in a setting of
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can identify the incorrect beliefs as well as the true data-generating process, conditional on
the private information. We also give a relaxation of the correct interim beliefs condition
which restricts the extent of belief incorrectness: the agent never receives hard evidence
that her beliefs may be incorrect because the realization of s is always in the support of
her belief q.
Section 3 introduces the dynamic model. The observable is now a history-dependent
aSCF : for every history ht−1 occurring with positive probability, the analyst observes
frequencies of the choice in a subsequent decision problem At together with the realization
of the objective state in the respective period (we say agent picks ft from menu At after
history ht−1 and objective state st is realized with probability ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1)). Histories
have empirical content, as they help the analyst identify the serial correlation in the private
information of the agent, i.e. in her tastes and beliefs.
We assume these history-dependent aSCFs satisfy the assumptions of the static model.
In contrast to the static case there is now limited observability : not every menu is observ-
able after every history. This is a similar observability problem as in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17]
and technically its solution in this paper adapts theirs to our more general setting with
payoff-relevant states. It relies in identifying two classes of histories which reveal the same
private information.9 Whenever the observable satisfies the history-dependent version of
the static model and the two history equivalence properties the analyst can identify the
stochastic evolution of the private information of the agent as well as the true data-
generating process of the objective states. This is the DR-SEU model, the namesake of
the paper.
After establishing the main characterization result we focus on two special cases of
DR-SEU whose static versions are indistinguishable: Evolving SEU, where the evolution
of agent’s Bernoulli utility is given through a Bellman equation and its specialization,
Gradual Learning, where the agent is learning about a fixed but unknown taste. Ad-
ditionally, and because we need it for the dynamic characterization results, we describe
when a menu preference comes from an agent who is subjectively learning both about
objective states and about her Bernoulli utility/taste through a new axiom called Weak
Dominance. Intuitively, such an agent would always prefer to exchange any menu of acts
A for a menu A¯ which allows her to pick any of the prizes occurring in A with positive
probability irrespective of the realization of the uncertainty she’s facing ex-ante.
Section 4 leverages the characterization theorems to prove comparative statics results.
In a setting of non-stochastic taste we address the question of how an analyst can compare
agents with respect to their biasedness of beliefs. Namely, given a commonly observable
characteristic, e.g. gender, race or letter grades, if the analyst fixes a direction of biased
beliefs for every characteristic, he can tell from stochastic choice data when an agent is
more biased than another agent. Intuitively, the choice data give evidence that the more
biased agent values menus uniformly more differently to a fictitious unbiased agent than
the less biased agent. Finally, in the special case of the Gradual Learning representation,
we show how an analyst may distinguish when an agent’s uncertainty for taste fully
resolves and how the analyst may compare different agents with respect to the speed
of learning their taste. Intuitively, agent 2 learns her taste more slowly than agent 1
whenever the data suggests that agent 2 satisfies Weak Dominance whenever agent 1
non-stochastic taste.
9The two equivalence properties are called Contraction history independence and Linear history in-
dependence.
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does.
Section 5 concludes and comments on avenues for future work. The appendix contains
the proofs of the main theorem for the static setting as well as of the main theorem for
the dynamic setting accompanied by a set of auxiliary results necessary to understand the
main proofs. Other characterization theorems as well as technical extensions of results
from several papers in the literature which are needed for the proofs are relegated to the
online appendix. The latter also contains a section considering the case when the analyst
does not observe the realization of objective states.
Before continuing with the theoretical set up and the results we note two examples
which illustrate the questions and issues this paper addresses.
1.1 Examples
1.1.1 A model of discrimination
Consider an employer at a job fair looking at applications for a job vacancy.10 The job
consists of performing a task, after the job fair is concluded, whose outcome has two
potential values coming from S1 = {g, b} (g stands for good and b for bad). We assume
that whether g or b is realized depends on both the ability of the employee as well as
other randomness outside of the control of the employee.
During the job fair, in the first period of the model (t = 0) some characteristic
s0 ∈ S0 = {s′0, s′′0} of the applicant is revealed to the employer, say ethnicity, gender,
education level, etc. We assume the distribution of s0 over S0 is known to the employer.
This may be justified e.g. if the data about the prevalence of the characteristic s0 in the
population of the applicants at the job fair is public. In the second period (t = 1) the
employer has beliefs about the outcome of the task, conditional on the revealed character-
istic s0. These are coded by (qˆ1, qˆ2) = (qˆ1(g|s′0), qˆ1(g|s′′0)) ∈ (0, 1)2. These can potentially
be different from the true data generating process which here for simplicity is given by
q1(g|s′0) = q1(g|s′′0) = 12 . Assume here for simplicity that the analyst knows this data-
generating process. In our example we say that the employer has incorrect beliefs if the
following holds.
Incorrect Beliefs: 1 > qˆ1(g|s′0) > 12 > qˆ1(g|s′′0) > 0.11
We assume in the following that the objective state s1 (task outcome) is also observable
to the analyst after the choice of the employer.
Given the observed characteristic s0 the employer can choose in t = 1 whether to hire
the candidate (formally, act hs0 : S1→R ) or not hire (act nhs0 : S1→R). In the case of not
hiring, the utility of the employer is always zero us0(nhs0(s1)) = 0 for all s0 ∈ S0, s1 ∈ S1.
In the case of hiring the employer has (possibly) stochastic utility us0 : R→R which
satisfies
us0(hs0(g)) = gs0 , us0(hs0(b)) = bs0 with gs0 > 0 > bs0 almost surely.
Stochastic utility conditional on the realization of s0 is meant to capture the possibility
that the utility of a successful task for the employer may depend on the specific task to
10Many situations have the same structure: lending activity of a bank, university applications, etc.
11Other assumptions are possible. These here are for definiteness.
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be solved, here assumed unobservable to the analyst, besides on the characteristic s0 of
the employee. It may also happen due to other characteristics of the candidate besides s0
which are unobservable to the analyst but relevant to the employer.12 Finally, we assume
that whenever the employer is indifferent between hiring and not hiring a candidate he
uses an unbiased coin to break ties.
Besides biases in beliefs we allow for the possibility that the employer cares about the
realization of s0 as well. We require for the random variables gi, bi, i = 1, 2 to be jointly
continuously distributed and to fulfill the following condition.
(C) gs′0 ≥ gs′′0 > 0 > bs′0 ≥ bs′′0 almost surely.
A successful task benefits the employer more – and a failed one hurts him less – if it is
the deed of an agent of characteristic s′0 rather than s
′′
0. That is, the employer incurs
uniformly lower payoffs from s′′0 for each outcome.
We say that the employer cares about s0 if the following holds.
Preference for s′0: gs′0 > gs′′0 > 0 > bs′0 > bs′′0 almost surely.
Here we ask for the ‘extreme’ inequalities in condition (C) to hold strictly almost surely.13
Assume now that an analyst has frequency data on both hiring decisions at the job
fair and on the outcome of the task, even though she may not observe the precise type
of the task in every instance. Thus for all s0 = s
′
0, s
′′
0 and s1 = g, b the analyst observes
the limiting frequency that candidate s0 is hired, and that state s1 is realized, denoted
by ρs0(hs0 , {hs0 , nhs0}, s1). This paper gives conditions on stochastic choice data which
allows the following.
- As a first step the analyst can confirm that the true data-generating process is
unbiased, i.e. that q1(g|s′0) = q1(g|s′′0) = 12 holds. This corresponds to the constraint
ρs′0(fs′0 , {fs′0 , hs′0}, g) = ρs′′0 (fs′′0 , {fs′′0 , hs′′0}, g) =
1
2
.
- The analyst can also discern from stochastic choice data whether there is bias in be-
liefs, whether the employer cares about the realization of s0 or whether both are occurring
simultaneously.
Namely, whenever the employer is unbiased in beliefs and doesn’t care about the real-
ization of s0 per se he chooses to hire either candidate with the same positive probability.
This corresponds to the constraint∑
s1
ρs′0(fs′0 , {fs′0 , hs′0}, s1) =
∑
s1
ρs′′0 (fs′′0 , {fs′′0 , hs′′0}, s1).
Whenever there is either bias in beliefs or the employer has preference for s′0 he hires
candidate s′0 with strictly higher probability than candidate s
′′
0.∑
s1
ρs′0(fs′0 , {fs′0 , hs′0}, s1) >
∑
s1
ρs′′0 (fs′′0 , {fs′′0 , hs′′0}, s1) (1)
12The employer may have lexicographic preferences; she cares about s0 first and foremost but given
s0 also takes into account other unobservable features of the candidate.
13Just as for beliefs other assumptions are here possible.
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Finally, whenever the employer has incorrect beliefs and has preference for s′0, all else
equal he hires candidate s′0 with a (weakly) higher probability than in the case of either
bias in beliefs only or preference for s′0 only. This corresponds to a larger gap in (1).
This example shows that stochastic choice data coming from standard subjective ex-
pected utility (SEU) maximizers can be used to identify biases, whenever the analyst gets
information for the realization of the objective state (here whether the task is successful
or not). As we show, stochastic choice data allow comparisons of different employers in
terms of their biases in much more complicated examples than the current one.
1.1.2 Educational choices
Consider an undergraduate student who adheres to subjective expected utility (SEU) and
has beliefs about the final outcome in the job market once she graduates. This outcome
comes from a finite objective state space, say,
S = {job in finance, job in tech industry, job in government, graduate school, start-up}.
At the beginning of the undergraduate education the student is also learning about her
taste regarding possible careers and so has stochastic tastes v˜0, v˜1, . . . , v˜τ about the final
outcome. At the end of some student-specific year τ ≥ 1, learning about taste ceases: the
student has a fixed Bernoulli utility v about the final outcome S even though her beliefs
qt about the final outcome in S remain stochastic throughout the whole higher education
experience.
Formally, let school years be encoded by t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}. Let st be a period-t signal
about final outcome coming from a finite space of objective signals St. These can be
grades or feedback from faculty, experiences in internships, etc. Let acts (decisions of
a student) correspond to jobs/projects/classes she engages with in each year and menus
At be finite collections of such acts the student can choose from in each education year.
Denote the set of menus available in period t by At. Given a realized signal st each act ft
in period t delivers a lottery over pairs consisting of an instantaneous prize from a finite
set of prizes Z and a continuation decision problem At+1 from At+1.14 The realization of
the continuation problem At+1 corresponds to jobs/internships/classes possibly available
to the student, after she has taken a current class corresponding to the act ft. Say that
an act ft is constant, if the lottery over pairs of current prize and continuation decision
doesn’t depend on the realization of the signal st, i.e. it is the same for all st in St. E.g. a
constant act is a summer job a student may take only due to financial reasons and which
doesn’t enhance her intellectual skills in the job market for any possible career.
The analyst observes past choices of, say act fl chosen from menu Al as well as the
realization of signal sl ∈ Sl, and for the current period t ∈ {1, . . . , T} she observes after the
history ht−1 = (f0, A0, s0; . . . ; ft−1, At−1, st−1) the frequencies of triples (ft, At, st). These
history-dependent frequencies, denoted by ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1), are to be interpreted as after
history ht−1 student chose ft when facing At and the objective signal st was realized.
If the history-dependent preference of the student over menus/decision problems from
At, t = 0, . . . , T were observable, it is intuitive to expect it satisfies the following proper-
ties.
14There is no continuation problem in period t = T .
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A. Preference for Flexibility: Every year the student prefers menus which are larger
rather than subsets thereof. That is, Bt ∈ At is less valuable than At ∈ At if
Bt ⊂ At. This is because a strict subset offers less option value for a SEU agent
than a full menu.
B. Weak Dominance for t ≤ τ : At τ = 0, say, she prefers to replace a single act f1
whose utility depends on the realization of the signal s1 with a menu of constant acts
A¯ = {f1(s1) : s1 ∈ S1} offering the same outcomes (lotteries over Z ×A2) as every
s1−dependent outcome of f1. This is because menu A¯ offers insurance against her
stochastic taste in t = 1. Intuitively, summer jobs where the student doesn’t learn
new specialized skills for the job market may be more valuable to a student who
is still unsure of her taste about different careers than committing to an internship
whose outcome is highly dependent on what she learns about her career taste at the
end of the current period.
C. Strong Dominance for t > τ : From the end of period τ on, whenever the act ft+1
delivers weakly better utility for each realization of the signal in period t + 1 than
gt+1, from the perspective of the end of year t, the menu {ft+1, gt+1} is as good as
{ft+1}. This unambiguous comparison of continuation problems in the end of year t
becomes possible because at the end of period τ the career tastes of the student have
stabilized and are deterministic.15 Given a fixed taste about distinct careers she is
able to at least determine when an act is uniformly more valuable than another, no
matter the realization of the objective signal in the current period t.
We show how the properties A-C can be derived from ex-post stochastic choice from menus
without knowing anything about the preference over menus of the student. Moreover, our
methods allow the analyst to also determine the speed with which an agent, such as the
student in this example, learns her final taste v (e.g. to determine the τ of the student).
For example, if the act f1 is taking an internship which requires substantial investment in
learning new skills in a very specific field like finance, i.e. an act whose outcome is highly
dependent on s1 as well as the realization of the future taste v˜1, we should expect an agent
who knows by the end of period t = 0 that her taste is so that she likes to get a job in
finance, to prefer committing to f1 at the end of t = 0. This should be especially the case
if the alternative is to face a menu which offers acts whose outcomes don’t depend much
on s1 or the realization of v˜1 such as helping out with grading an undergrad class, taking
up a summer job in the library, etc, even though they might be as financially profitable
as picking the internship in finance f1.
Finally, given richness of the data, our characterization results show how an analyst is
able to compare different agents according to their speed of learning about taste in similar
situations.16
15The names are justified: after formally introducing the technical set up and the axioms in the main
body of the paper we show in online appendix section 5 that under Preference for Flexibility, Strong
Dominance implies Weak Dominance but not the other way around.
16Intuitively in our example, student 1 learns her taste faster than student 2, if stochastic choice data
give evidence that student 1 satisfies Strong Dominance whenever student 2 does.
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2 Static Random Subjective Expected Utility with
observable objective states
In this section we introduce and characterize the static model. This is the crucial building
block of the dynamic model of section 3.
Set up in the static model. Let Z be a prize space assumed to have a separable,
metric topological structure. Let S be a finite set of objective states17 and F the set of
Anscombe-Aumann acts (AA acts) with a typical element given by f : S→∆(Z) where
∆(Z) denotes the space of simple lotteries over prizes in Z.18 Finally, denote by A the
collection of finite, nonempty subsets of F. A typical element in A is called a menu and
denoted by a capital letter, e.g. A ∈ A. A is equipped with the Hausdorff topology.
Given a belief of the agent over S, i.e. an element q from ∆(S) and an Expected Utility
function u : ∆(Z)→R to evaluate simple lotteries, we say the agent satisfies Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU) with beliefs q and taste u if the utility of an act f is given by
q · (u ◦ f) := ∑s∈S q(s)u(f(s)).19
Define
N(A, f) = {(q, u) ∈ ∆(S)× RX : q · (u ◦ f) ≥ q · (u ◦ g), g ∈ A}.
This is the set of SEUs which can rationalize the choice of f from menu A.
Denote N+(A, f) the respective subset of N(A, f) where f is not tied to other acts
from A.
Moreover, define
M(A;u, q) = {f ∈ A : q · (u ◦ f) ≥ q · (u ◦ g), g ∈ A}.
This is the set of maximizers when the agent’s belief about objective state of the world is
q and her Bernoulli utility is u.
The timeline of the one-period model is the following.
s realized,
payoff f(s)
Agent
picks f out
of A
SEU (q,u)
realized
passive learning
s realized,
payoff f(s)
Agent
picks f out
of A
posterior
belief q
realized
active learning
Agent picks 
info structure μ
t
Figure 1: Timeline for the static setting.
Let µ be a probability measure over ∆(S)× RX , equipped with the sigma-algebra F
generated by sets of the form N+(A, f), N(A, f) or alternatively with the Borel sigma-
algebra of ∆(S)× RX .20
17The wording objective means that the state s is verifiable by both agent and analyst after it occurs.
18A lottery is called simple if only finitely many prizes can happen with positive probability. ∆(Z) is
equipped with the topology of weak convergence of probability measures. The set of acts F is equipped
with the product-topology over ∆(Z)S .
19In the following we often identify the EU-functional u : ∆(Z)→R with its Bernoulli utility from RZ .
20This is constructed as a product sigma-Algebra of the respective Borel sigma-Algebra of weak con-
vergence on ∆(S) and the Borel one from RX (the latter again a product sigma-Algebra).
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We say that µ is regular if µ(N+(A, f)) = µ(N(A, f)) for any A ∈ A, f ∈ F. In this
paper regular measures µ have the following form: whenever there are ties, i.e. M(A;u, q)
is not a singleton for some A and SEU pair (q, u) the agent randomly picks an auxiliary
SEU pair (p, v) such that M(M(A;u, q); p, v) is a singleton.21
Observable in the static model. We assume the analyst observes an augmented
stochastic choice function defined as in part 1) of the following definition.
Definition 1. 1) An augmented stochastic choice function (aSCF) is a map ρ : F×A×
S→[0, 1] with the properties
(a) ∑
s
∑
f∈A
ρ(f, A, s) = 1, ∀A ∈ A.
(b)
ρ(s) :=
∑
f∈A
ρ(f, A, s) =
∑
f∈B
ρ(f,B, s) > 0, ∀A,B ∈ A, s ∈ S.
2) A stochastic choice function (SCF) ζ is a map ζ : F×A→[0, 1] with the property
∑
f∈A
ζ(f, A) = 1, ∀A ∈ A
The second requirement in the definition of aSCF makes sure that we can define the
observed frequency of objective state s independently of the decision problem the agent
is facing. This says that objective uncertainty is fully exogenous and independent from
the problem the agent is facing in addition to being outside the influence of the analyst.
Formally, it allows the definition of ρ(s) =
∑
f∈A ρ(f, A, s) for any A and s ∈ S, i.e. the
probability of observing s in the data.
For a given aSCF ρ we denote in the following by ρ¯ the SCF derived from summing
each ρ(f, A, s) across states. Formally,
ρ¯(f, A) :=
∑
s∈S
ρ(f, A, s), f ∈ A,A ∈ A.
Discussion of the Observable. Assuming that the data of the analyst comes in the
form of aSCFs characterizes an analyst with superior information compared to the set
up of [Lu ’16]. In many realistic situations this is a viable assumption: loan performance
data, how students perform in school or how an employee performs in some task is often
observable to an outside analyst.22
21The interested reader can peruse the proofs in Section 1 in the online appendix for the mathematical
details. This tie-breaking rule is special and it will be reflected in the properties of the data in the form of
a specific axiom: Extremeness-type of Axioms (see next subsections) imply tie-breaking through SEUs.
22Section 2 of the online appendix considers extensively the case when the observable corresponds to
SCF, that is the realization of s is not observable by the analyst. For the static setting the whole theory,
up to explicit modeling of the tie-breaking is contained in [Lu ’16], whereas the dynamic version of his
model can be derived easily using the approach of [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17]. See the online appendix
for more details.
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[Ellis ’18] and [Caplin, Dean ’15] also consider state-dependent choice data but have
a different focus: that of information acquisition in a static setting. They don’t study
the question of misspecified learning, either because the analyst doesn’t get to see the
realization of the objective state or because they assume from the start that the agent is
using the correct prior. [Caplin, Martin ’14] considers state-dependent stochastic choice
data in a passive learning model similar to ours but assume that the taste of the agent is
deterministic and known to the analyst.
Remark 1. The observable in Definition 1 has more general applicability, e.g. it can be
used even if there is partial observability of s as long as there is full identification in the
aggregate.
In more detail, assume the analyst observes a signal y ∈ Y about the true realization of
the objective state s ∈ S instead of its realization. If µˆ(y|s) gives the (menu-independent)
conditional probability of observing signal y when the realized state is s the assumption of
aSCFs as observable is valid for the analysis if the following two conditions hold:
- µˆ is known by the analyst,
- The matrix (µˆ(y|s))y∈Y,s∈S is quadratic and has full rank.
2.1 Representation in the Static Setting
We now introduce the Random Subjective Expected Utility representation for an aSCF
ρ we are after. An agent has private information about both beliefs over the realization
of the objective state s as well as her taste u ∈ RZ . The analyst observes only aggregate
frequencies of choice data and realizations of the objective state from the same agent in
many choice instances or similar aggregate data choices from a population of agents.
Definition 2. A Random SEU representation (R-SEU) of the aSCF ρ is a tuple
(Ω,F∗, µ, (q, u, s), (qˆ, uˆ)) such that
A. (Ω,F∗, µ) is a probability space with finite Ω,
B. (q, u, s) : Ω→∆(S)×RZ×S is an injective map, has non-constant SEU (q(ω), u(ω))
and s(ω) ∈ supp(q(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω.
C. Either
C1. The representation has correct interim beliefs (cib): µ(s ∈ ·|q) = q(·)
or otherwise
C2. The representation has no unforeseen contingencies (nuc):
supp (µ(s ∈ ·|q, u)) ⊂ supp (q(·)).
D. the (q, u)-measurable tiebreaking process (qˆ, uˆ) : Ω→RZ is regular and for all f ∈ A,
ρ(f, A, s) = µ(C(f, A, s)).
Here, C is defined as
C(f, A, s) = {ω ∈ Ω : f ∈M (M(A, q(ω), u(ω)), qˆ(ω), uˆ(ω)) , s(ω) = s}.
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In the following ω are called states of the world. C(f, A, s) denotes then the collection
of states of the world where the agent chooses f from A and the objective state s is
realized.
Before continuing, we note down the true data-generating process (DGP) derived from
the representation.
Definition 3. For an aSCF ρ that satisfies a R-SEU representation define the DGP, a
∆(S)-valued random variable q¯ : Ω→∆(S) as
q¯(ω)(·) = µ(s ∈ ·|q, u)(ω). Then the property of correct interim beliefs (cib) can be written
as
q¯ = q
whereas that of unforeseen contingencies (nuc) is written as
supp(q¯) ⊂ supp(q).
2.2 The revealed subjective support of a SCF
For this subsection only, we look at an agent whose preference  over acts is continuous
but otherwise arbitrary (i.e. not necessarily SEU) and introduce a concept which is helpful
in the characterization results of this paper in addition to having general applicability
outside of this model as well. If the only fact the analyst knows about the stochastic
choice of an agent is that it comes from a continuous preference, the sets N(f, A) can be
written as
N(f, A) = { continuous preference over F : fg, g ∈ A}.
Say that the stochastic choice data of an agent satisfies a Random Utility Model if the
stochasticity in choice follows from the randomness of her preference. Formally, we define
as follows.
Definition 4 (Random Utility Model). Say that a SCF ζ on F satisfies a Random Utility
Model (RUM) if there exists a regular probability measure µ over continuous preferences
over F so that for every A ∈ A and f ∈ A we have
ζ(f, A) = µ(N(f, A)).
The randomness in preferences may originate from her stochastic perceptions of the
decision environment she faces, for example in the special case of SEUs her beliefs may
be stochastic. In the case of SEUs randomness can also come from stochastic tastes.
Alternatively, a RUM may be interpreted as representing data from a population of
heterogeneous agents who have deterministic preferences. The following definition shows
how to identify from data the collection of preferences underlying a RUM.
Definition 5. For a SCF ζ which satisfies a RUM let RSSupp(ζ), the revealed subjective
support of ζ, be defined through
RSSupp(ζ) ={ over F : ∀A ∈ A, f ∈ A, if  ∈ N(A, f)
then there exists (fn, An)→(f, A) with ζ(fn, An) > 0}.
Here convergence (fn, An)→(f, A) is in the product topology of F×A.
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This says that a preference  is in the revealed subjective support of ζ if every choice
that can be rationalized by  appears in the data encoded by ζ, up to tie-breaking.23
If the RUM has support on SEUs, the definition ‘picks out’ the SEUs in the support
of µ from Definition 4 up to positive affine transformations of the respective Bernoulli
utilities.
Aside. Another compact and suggestive way to write down the revealed subjective
support of a SCF ζ is as follows.
For a continuous preference  over F denote the set of choices it can rationalize as
R, that is
R = {(f, A) ∈ F×A :  ∈ N(f, A)}.
This is the set of choice data that are consistent with maximization of .
The set of choices explained by the data represented by some SCF ζ is
N(ζ) = {(f, A) : f ∈ A, ∃(fn, An)→(f, A) with ζ(fn, An) > 0 for all n}.
Then RSSupp(ρ¯) can be characterized as follows.
RSSupp(ζ) = { : R ⊂ N(ζ)}.
2.3 Axiomatization of aSCFs
The following axiomatization of aSCFs is based on previous results about the axiomati-
zation of SCFs in [Lu ’16] and [Ahn, Sarver ’13].
Axioms 0-1 till 0-5 below are adaptations to our setting of aSCFs of the standard
axioms from Theorem S.1 of [Lu ’16]. They imply that an aSCF comes from an underlying
RUM whose revealed subjective support contains only SEUs. Axiom 0-6 is adapted from
[Ahn, Sarver ’13] and ensures that there can only occur finitely many such SEUs.
Standard Axioms in statewise form. For all s ∈ S it holds
Axiom 0-1: Statewise Monotonicity. ρ(f, A, s) ≥ ρ(f,B, s) for A ⊂ B.
Axiom 0-2: Statewise Linearity. ρ(λf + (1 − λ)g, λA + (1 − λ){g}, s) = ρ(f, A, s)
for any A ∈ A, g ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Axiom 0-3: Statewise Extremeness. ρ(ext(A), A, s) = 1 for all A ∈ A.24
Axiom 0-4: Statewise Continuity. A 3 A 7→ ρ(·, A|s) is continuous.25
23In more detail:  occurs in the data if for every choice pair (f,A) either (1) ρ(f,A) > 0 and
 ∈ N(A, f) or if (2) ρ(f,A) = 0 and  ∈ N(A, f) then ρ(f,A) = 0 only happens due to tie-breaking.
24Note that F has a mixture structure in the usual way. In particular, one can form conv(A), the
convex hull of A for any menu A. Then ext(A) is identified with the set of extremum points of conv(A).
25The image of the mapping is the space of simple lotteries on F, equipped with the topology of weak
convergence of probability measures.
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Axiom 0-5: State Independence. To explain this axiom we first introduce some
terminology: a menu A is called constant if it contains only constant acts. Given a menu
A and a state r ∈ S let A(r) = {f(r) : f ∈ A} be the constant menu containing all
lotteries from acts in A which happen at state r.
Then State Independence says: Suppose f(s1) = f(s2), A1(s1) = A2(s2) and
Ai(s) = {f(s)}, s 6= si, i = 1, 2. Then ρ(f, A1, s) = ρ(f, A1 ∪ A2, s).
Intuitively, if an act f yields the same payoff in states s1 and s2, payoffs of menu A1
in s1 are the same as those of menu A2 in s2 and acts in Ai only differ in si then the
probability of choosing f in A1 is the same as choosing f in A1∪A2, unless the realization
of the Bernoulli utility of the agent depends on whether s1 or s2 is realized.
Axiom 0-6: Statewise Finiteness. There is K > 0 such that for all A ∈ A, there is
B ⊂ A with |B| ≤ K independent of s such that for every f ∈ A \B there are sequences
fn→mf and Bn→mB with ρ(fn, {fn} ∪Bn, s) = 0.
To state the axiom of correct beliefs we define for a SEU pair (q, u) where p is the
belief of the agent and u her Bernoulli utility as piq(p, u) = p. That is, the projection to
the belief used from the agent. Furthermore, in the following ρ(s|f, A) is the conditional
probability of observing the realization of the objective state s in the data conditional on
the agent choosing f from menu A.
Axiom 0-7: Correct Interim Beliefs (CIB). For all f ∈ F and A ∈ A with ρ¯(f, A) >
0 we have
ρ(·|f, A) ∈ piq (conv (N(f, A) ∩RSSupp(ρ¯))) = conv (piq(N(f, A) ∩RSSupp(ρ¯))) . (2)
The axiom says that the DGP of the objective state s conditional on observed choice
(f, A) is a mixture of beliefs which correspond to some SEU that fulfill two natural
conditions simultaneously : 1) the SEU is contained in the revealed subjective support of
the data and 2) the SEU rationalizes the choice f from A.
Incorrect beliefs can arise due to different reasons: the agent may observe objective
signals with noise, she may have a misspecified prior or otherwise have subjectively biased
beliefs even though they average out to the correct prior. We exclude in this paper the
case when incorrect beliefs originate from non-Bayesian updating with respect to any
prior.
In contrast to section 6 of [Lu ’16] here the analyst gets information about the real-
ization of the objective state and can glean out the true DGP from data. This allows
her to make a direct comparison between the true DGP and the beliefs of the agent.26
Section 7 of [Lu ’16] constructs a test of CIB based on test acts. His methods require
non-stochastic taste whereas our axiom is robust to stochasticity of tastes.
Now we present a relaxation of the Correct Interim Beliefs Axiom which allows for
incorrect beliefs but so that the incorrectness remains undetected by the agent ex-post.
This is inconsequential in a static setting but has repercussions in the dynamic setting of
Section 3 where we study an agent who passively learns about objective states as well as
her taste in every period.
26Moreover, in the dynamic model in Section 3 we assume that the agent is sophisticated and thus
our model doesn’t allow any prospective overconfindence/underconfidence as in [Lu ’16].
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Axiom 0-7’: No Unforeseen Contingencies (NUC) For all f ∈ F and A ∈ A with
ρ¯(f, A) > 0 it holds
supp (ρ(·|f, A)) ⊂
⋃
{supp(q) : q ∈ piq(N(A, f) ∩RSSupp(ρ¯))}.
Our first main result gives the axiomatization of aSCFs in a static setting.
Theorem 0. The aSCF ρ on A admits a R-SEU representation with CIB satisfied if
and only if it satisfies Axioms 0-1 till 0-7. It admits a R-SEU representation with NUC
satisfied if and only if it satisfies Axioms 0-1 till 0-6 together with Axiom 0-7’.
In the following whenever for an aSCF ρ the Axioms 0-1- till 0-6 together with 0-7’
are satisfied, we say Axiom 0 is satisfied for ρ.
2.3.1 Informational Representation for aSCFs
We consider here the special case of Theorem 0 where all possible Bernoulli utilities in the
representation are equal up to positive affine transformations of each other. This implies
that stochasticity in choice only comes from randomness in beliefs.
To facilitate analysis, we require the existence of a best constant act. This requirement
is easily expressed in terms of stochastic choice.
Axiom: Existence of a constant best act. There exists a constant act f¯ ∈ F such
that for every act f ∈ F it holds
f 6= f¯ =⇒ ρ(f, {f, f¯}) = 0.
The existence of a best constant act is assured for example if Z consists of monetary
prizes and the preferences of the agent over money are strictly increasing. Whenever this
Axiom is satisfied, it becomes easier to eschew tie-breaking considerations when writing
down other Axioms on data.
The axiom on data which ensures that the agent has a deterministic taste is the
following.27
Axiom: C-Determinism*. For any menu A consisting of constant acts it holds true
lim
a→1
ρ
(
af + (1− a)f¯ ;A \ {f} ∪ {af + (1− a)f¯}) ∈ {0, 1}.
This says that except for possible stochastic tie-breaking, constant acts are chosen
deterministically. On the other hand, if taste is stochastic then choice from constant
menus should be stochastic, even after taking into account possible stochastic tie-breaking.
Given this intuition the following characterization result is not surprising.
Proposition 1 (Informational Representation for aSCFs). Assume that an aSCF ρ has
a R-SEU representation with regular measure µ. Assume that there exists a constant best
act.
Then the following are equivalent.
27This is an adaptation of the C-Determinism Axiom from the [Lu ’16] who doesn’t consider tie-
breaking explicitly as we do.
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A. For all (q, u), (p, v) ∈ RSSupp(ρ¯) u is a positive affine transformation of v.
B. ρ satisfies C-Determinism*.
3 Dynamic Random Subjective Expected Utility
This section is devoted to the dynamic model. We introduce the general representation
and two interesting specializations of it. After that, we give axioms for all three repre-
sentations.
Set up in the dynamic model. Let Z be a finite prize space, ∞ > T ≥ 1 and for
each t = 0, . . . , T let St be finite spaces of objective states. The objective states evolve
according to a DGP which cannot be influenced by the agent (passive learner situation).
Define recursively the spaces of consequences for every period as follows. Let XT = Z
and the set of acts FT with a typical element fT : ST→∆(Z). Let AT be the collection of
finite sets from FT . Then continue inductively by defining Xt = Z ×At+1, where At+1 is
the collection of finite menus from Ft+1. Ft is then the set of acts ft : St→∆(Xt).28
Thus, an act ft at time t < T gives for each possible objective state st a lottery
over current consumption and a continuation decision problem/menu. We denote fAt the
marginal act on menus At+1 and f
Z
t the marginal act on Z induced by ft.
We assume in each period (qt, ut) is private information of the agent whereas the
realization of st is observed by both the agent and the analyst. Thus stochasticity in
choice comes from the information asymmetry between the agent and the analyst in
the single-agent interpretation, whereas in the population interpretation the analyst is
observing dynamic data from a population of SEU agents whose preference characteristics
are unknown.
Visually the timeline is depicted in Figure 2.
t t+1
    S
t
realized
(z
t
, A
t+1
)
realized
Choice of f
t
 
from A
t
(q
t
,u
t
) realized
Figure 2: Timeline for the dynamic setting.
The observable in the dynamic setting. The analyst observes histories with a typi-
cal element ht as well as history-dependent aSCFs ρt(·|ht−1). The collection of the former is
denoted by Ht whereas of the latter simply by ρ and called a dynamic augmented stochas-
tic choice function (dynamic aSCF). These are described recursively as follows. For t = 0
the analyst observes an aSCF ρ0 as in Definition 1. The set H0 collects all histories h0 =
(f0, A0, s0) ∈ F×A0×S0 such that ρ0(h0) > 0. For h0 ∈ H0 denoteA1(h0) := supp(fA0 ) the
28Furthermore we denote in the following by Act the collection of period−t menus consisting of constant
acts.
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set of period−1 menus that follow h0 with positive probability. The construction is contin-
ued recursively: for any history ht ∈ Ht there is an aSCF ρt+1(·|ht) which can be used to
define the set of possible continuation menus At+1(ht). The set of period−(t+1) histories
is then Ht+1 := {(ht, ft+1, At+1, st+1) : At+1 ∈ At+1(ht), ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht) > 0}.
In simple words: histories are finite sequences of triplets (fi, Ai, si) with the interpre-
tation that the data shows that with positive probability fi is chosen from menu Ai and
si is the realized objective state in period i. Moreover, a history can only happen if the
elements (fi, Ai, si) of its sequence happen successively with positive probability starting
from the ‘oldest’ one (f0, A0, s0) to the most recent.
The data reflects limited observability in the sense that ρt is defined only conditional
on histories which happen with positive probability in the data. We show below how this
can be overcome.
3.1 Representations
We first define properties shared by all representations. The focus is on having properties
which are tractable but still allow for a general enough representation.
3.1.1 Simplicity, regularity and preference-based tie-breaking.
Say that the triple (Ft,qt,ut, st)0≤t≤T is simple w.r.t.29 the probability space (Ω,F∗, µ)
if
A. each Ft is generated by a finite partition such that µ(Ft(ω)) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Here
Ft(ω) is the partition cell of Ft which contains ω.
B. the map (qt, ut, st) : Ω→∆(St) × RXt × St has non-constant SEU (qt(ω), ut(ω)) for
all ω and is adapted to the filtration Ft, t ≤ T . Moreover, whenever ω′ 6∈ Ft(ω) it
holds (qt(ω), ut(ω), st(ω)) 6= (qt(ω′), ut(ω′), st(ω′)).
The tiebreakers (qˆt, uˆt)0≤t≤T are regular and preference-based, i.e.
A. µ(ω ∈ Ω : |M(At, qˆt, uˆt)| = 1) = 1 for all At ∈ At.
B. conditional on FT (ω) the sequence (qˆ1, uˆ1), . . . , (qˆT , uˆT ) is independent and
C. µ((qˆt, uˆt) ∈ ·|FT (ω)) = µ((qˆt, uˆt) ∈ ·|ql(ω), ul(ω), l ≤ t) for all t.
Simplicity and regularity are necessary for a parsimonious representation, whereas the
preference-based condition incorporated in C. ensures that the tie-breaking of the agent
depends only on her realized SEU in the period at hand (and through it also on past
history) but not on the realization of the objective state in the current period.
We define for a triple (fk, Ak, sk) the set
C(fk, Ak, sk) = {ω ∈ Ω : fk ∈M (M(Ak, qk(ω), uk(ω)), qˆk(ω), uˆk(ω)) , sk(ω) = sk}.
These are the states of the world which rationalize the observable (fk, Ak, sk) in period
k. Similarly one defines for a history ht = (A0, f0, s0; . . . ;At, ft, st) the set of states of the
world which rationalize the occurrence of the history.
C(ht) = ∩l≤tC(Al, fl, sl).
29w.r.t. stands for with respect to.
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3.1.2 The general representation.
We are now ready to write down the most general representation of a dynamic aSCF. It
doesn’t impose any functional restrictions on the Bernoulli utilities of the agents and only
a minimal restriction on the evolution of beliefs.
Definition 6. A Dynamic Random SEU representation (DR-SEU) of the dynamic aSCF
ρ is a tuple (Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, (qt, ut), st, (qˆt, uˆt))0≤t≤T ) such that
A. (Ω,F∗, µ) is a finitely additive probability space,
B. the filtration (Ft) ⊂ F∗ and the Ft−adapted process (qt, ut, st) : Ω→∆(St)×RXt×St
is simple,
C. the F∗-measurable tiebreaking process (qˆt, uˆt) : Ω→RXt is regular and preference-
based and for all ft ∈ At, ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(At),
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1) = µ(C(ft, At, st)|C(ht−1)).
D. Either
D.1. The representation has correct interim beliefs (CIB):
µ(st ∈ ·|qt) = qt(·) for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T},
or otherwise
D.2. The representation has no unforeseen contingencies (NUC):
supp (µ(st ∈ ·|qt, ut)) ⊂ supp (qt(·)).
Some explanations are in order. History ht−1 happens with the probability µ(C(ht−1)):
the state of the world has to be so that for each l ≤ t the realized subjective state/SEU
(ql, ul) picks fl from Al, fl survives any possible tie-breaking and finally, in period l the
objective state sl is realized.
Conditional on C(ht−1) occurring, ft is chosen from At only if the realized subjective
state in period t given by the pair (qt, ut) is so that a SEU-maximizing choice from At is
ft and ft survives any possible tie-breaking.
Note that the stochastic process of the objective and subjective states is unconstrained,
except for the condition D: the agent uses the correct data-generating process conditional
on her private information (correct interim beliefs) or otherwise she respects the require-
ment of (no unforeseen contingencies), i.e. the agent never gets hard evidence that her
belief process is misspecified. The only other requirement embodied in the definition is
that the agent uses Bayes rule to update her beliefs.
3.1.3 Two special cases: Evolving SEU vs. Gradual Learning.
As noted before, the general representation doesn’t include any behavioral restrictions
on the evolution of the beliefs and tastes of the agent besides the SEU assumptions and
that the agent remains Bayesian after every history with respect to her beliefs about the
future evolution of tastes and objective states. In particular, her beliefs about the future
SEU realizations may be incorrect. In this subsection we exclude this possibility.
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Evolving SEU. This specialization of DR-SEU captures a dynamically sophisticated
agent who correctly takes into account the evolution of her future SEU preferences.30
There is an Ft−adapted process of random EU-functionals vt, t = 0, . . . , T , the felicity
functions, over instantaneous consumption lotteries l ∈ ∆(Z) and a discount factor δ > 0
such that uT = vT and ut for t ≤ T is given by the following Bellman equation.
ut(ft(st)) = vt(f
Z
t (st)) + δEAt+1∼fAt (st),qt+1·ut+1
[
max
ft+1∈At+1
(qt+1 · ut+1)(ft+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft] . (3)
Here the conditional expectation E[·|Ft] takes into account the randomness coming from
the lottery fAt (st) of the continuation problem as well as from the uncertainty about the
SEU of the agent in period t+ 1. The agent makes the correct inference about the future
SEU qt+1 · ut+1, given her current information in Ft.
Definition 7. An Evolving SEU representation of the dynamic aSCF ρ is a tuple
(Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, qt, ut, st)0≤t≤T ) such that
A. (Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, qt, ut, st)0≤t≤T ) is a DR-SEU representation.
B. (3) holds true for the stochastic process of Bernoulli utilities ut, t = 0, . . . , T .
If we assume there is only one period (T = 0) then Evolving SEU collapses to the
static model of section 2. The same holds trivially true for the following special case of
Evolving SEU.
Gradual Learning. This is a specialization of the Evolving SEU representation which
captures an agent who is learning about her taste. This results in a martingale condition
on the evolution of the felicities vt, t = 0, . . . , T .
Definition 8. A Gradual Learning (GL-SEU) representation of the dynamic augmented
stochastic choice rule ρ is a tuple (Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, qt, ut, st)0≤t≤T ) such that
A. (Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, qt, ut, st)0≤t≤T ) is a Evolving-SEU representation.
B. There exists an EU-function v for lotteries in ∆(Z) such that for all t = 0, . . . , T it
holds
vt = E[v|Ft]. (4)
As we show in the following subsection dynamic stochastic choice data are enough to
distinguish the two special cases Evolving SEU and Gradual Learning even though the
two models coincide in the static setting.31
3.2 Axiomatic Characterizations
The first axiomatization concerns the most general representation.
30This model of sophisticated behavior still doesn’t encompass all possible sophisticated behav-
iors allowed by the general DR-SEU representation – see Example 3 concerning [Epstein ’06] and
[Epstein et al ’08] in subsection 3.2.
31[Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17] showed the same insight in a setting of lotteries and without objective
payoff-relevant states.
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3.2.1 Axioms for DR-SEU
Axioms for the general representation in Definition 6 can be classified in two groups. The
first group identifies two types of observationally equivalent histories. The second group
comprises requiring Axiom 0 from the static setting after each history together with a
technical axiom of history continuity.
Overcoming limited observability. Similar to [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17] we char-
acterize histories which are equivalent with respect to the information they reveal through
two axioms: Contraction History Independence and Linear History Independence. This
allows to overcome the limited observability problem.
Given a history ht−1 = (A0, f0, s0; . . . , At−1, ft−1, st−1) let (ht−1−k , (A
′
k, f
′
k, s
′
k)) be the
history of the form (A0, f0, s0; . . . ;A
′
k, f
′
k, s
′
k; . . . ;At−1, ft−1, st−1). That is, the history is
changed only in period k.
Definition 9. We say that gt−1 ∈ Hk−1 is contraction equivalent to ht−1 if for some k we
have gt−1 = (ht−1−k , (Bk, fk, sk)) where Ak ⊂ Bk and ρk(fk, Ak, sk|hk−1) = ρk(fk, Bk, sk|hk−1).
That is, when expanding the set of opportunities at a period k but otherwise holding
the history ht−1 intact, the same stochastic choice results in the period of the expansion.
Axiom 1: Contraction History Independence (CHI) For all t ≤ T, if gt−1 ∈
Ht−1(At) is contraction equivalent to ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(At) then for all st ∈ St
ρt(·, At, st|ht−1) = ρt(·, At, st|gt−1).
Intuitively, if the distribution of the preferences is stable, two contraction equivalent
histories should give the same stochastic choice in the future as well, all else equal. This is
because in the Definition 9 above, elements from Bk \Ak were not attractive to any SEU
in the underlying distribution of preferences which has induced either of the histories ht−1
and gt−1, and given the stability of the underlying distribution of preferences the content
of private information revealed from the two histories ht−1 and gt−1 is the same. This
implies that the continuation stochastic choice should be the same.
The other class of equivalent histories is the following.
Definition 10. A finite set of histories Gt−1 ⊂ Ht−1 is linearly equivalent to ht−1 =
(A0, f0, s0; . . . , At−1, ft−1, st−1) if
Gt−1 = {(ht−1−k , (λAk + (1− λ)Bk, λfk + (1− λ)gk, sk)) : gk ∈ Bk}.
That is, a history is changed only at a single period by having the revealed choice fk
from Ak mixed with all possible choices gk from a menu Bk.
One can calculate from the history-dependent aSCF, the probability choices condi-
tional on a set of histories Gt−1 by the formula
ρ(ft, At, st|Gt−1) =
∑
gt−1∈Gt−1
ρt(ft, At, st|gt−1) · ρ(g
t−1)∑
ht−1∈Gt−1 ρ(h
t−1)
.
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Axiom 2: Linear History Independence (LHI) For all t ≤ T if Gt−1 ⊂ Ht−1(At)
is linearly equivalent to ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(At), then ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1) = ρt(ft, At, st|Gt−1).
Intuitively, if we have a set of histories Gt−1 linearly equivalent to history ht−1 with the
mixing happening in period k, because of SEU-properties, fk is optimal from Ak if and
only if a mixture of the type λfk + (1 − λ)gk with some gk is optimal from the mixed
menu λ{fk} + (1 − λ)Bk. Therefore, the mixing doesn’t reveal anything new regarding
the private information of the agent and so continuation stochastic choice should be the
same.
Now let Axioms 1 and 2 hold for the observable and assume the menu At is not possible
with positive probability after history ht−1. Define
ρh
t−1
(ft, At, st) := ρt(ft, At, st|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1),
for some history dt−1 = (gk, {gk}, sk)0≤k≤t−1 which leads to menu At with probability one.
LHI ensures that the construction is well-defined and coincides with ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1)
whenever At ∈ At(ht−1). Note here that histories of the type dt−1 don’t reveal anything
about the private information of the agent. They should be interpreted as tools for the
analyst to obtain variation in the data, much needed for identification of the underlying
parameters.
History-Dependent R-SEU and History Continuity. We model agents who in
every period are SEU but have private information about their preferences. Therefore,
the data need to satisfy Axiom 0 from the static setting. This is the content of the next
Axiom.
Axiom 3: R-SEU in every period For all t ≤ T and ht−1, each of the history-
dependent aSCFs ρt(·|ht−1) satisfies Axiom 0 from the static setting, i.e. it has a R-SEU
representation.
The last axiom needed to characterize DR-SEU is a technical form of Continuity.
The following definition gives our concept of continuity for histories and is adapted from
[Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17].
Definition 11. 1) For a sequence of acts fn say that fn converges in mixture to the act
f , written as fn→mf , if there exists h ∈ F and αn→0 with fn = αnh+ (1− αn)f .
2) For a sequence of menus (Bn)n ⊂ A say that Bn converges in mixture to the act f ,
written Bn→mf , if there exists B ∈ A and αn with Bn = αnB + (1− αn){f}.
3) For a sequence of menus (An)n ⊂ A say that An converges in mixture to the menu
A, written An→mA, if for each f ∈ A there is a sequence (Bnf )n ⊂ A such that Bnf→m{f}
and An = ∪f∈ABnf .
We next define menus and histories without ties, a concept we also come across later.
Definition 12. For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T and ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 the set of period t−menus without
ties conditional on ht−1 is denoted by A∗t (ht−1) and consists of all At ∈ At such that for
any ft ∈ At and any sequences fnt →mft, st ∈ St and Bnt→mAt \ {ft} we have
lim
n
ρt(f
n
t , B
n
t ∪ {fnt }, st|ht−1) = ρt(ft, At, st).
For t = 0 we write A∗0 := A∗0(ht−1). The set of period t histories without ties is H∗t :=
{ht = (A0, f0, s0; . . . ;At, ft, st) ∈ Ht : Ak ∈ A∗t (hk−1), for all k ≤ t}.
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Intuitively, a menu At without ties is so that no matter the SEU of the agent, she never
needs to perform tie-breaking. Therefore the menu can be perturbed in any direction and
the probabilities of observing the perturbed act fnt chosen from the perturbed menu B
n
t
converge to the probability of observing ft chosen from At. A history without ties is so
that every menu occurring in it is without ties.
The technical Continuity axiom reads then as follows.
Axiom 4: History Continuity For all t ≤ T,At, ft and ht−1 ∈ Ht−1,
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1) ∈ co{lim
n
ρt+1(ft+1, At−1, st|ht−1,n) : ht,n→mht, ht−1,n ∈ H∗t−1}.
Whenever a history ht−1 is perturbed slightly, the change is in choices and decision
problems as the objective states sk, k ≤ t− 1 come from a finite set. If the perturbation
comes from menus without ties so that the agent doesn’t need to perform tie-breaking
along the path of the history, the probabilities of observing ft chosen from At as well as
st realized should change continuously with the history.
Theorem 1. For a dynamic aSCF ρ the Axioms 1-4 are equivalent to the existence of a
DR-SEU representation.
If we add Existence of a Best Act and C-Determinism* from subsection 2.3.1 to Axiom
0, we get a characterization of the special case of DR-SEU representation where the agent
knows her Bernoulli utility ut for certain in every period. That is, she is learning only
about the objective states.
Proposition 2 (Informational Representation for aSCFs). Assume that a dynamic aSCF
ρ has a DR-SEU representation with regular measure µ. Assume that there exists a
constant best prize.
Then the following are equivalent after every history ht observed with positive proba-
bility.
A. For all (qt, ut), (pt, vt) ∈ RSSupp(ρ¯t(·|ht)) u is a positive affine transformation of
vt.
B. ρt(·|ht) satisfies C-Determinism*.
3.2.2 Evolving SEU
History-dependent revealed preference. Stochastic choice coupled with the SEU
assumption imposes enough structure on data to allow the identification of a history-
dependent preference relation ht on acts. Intuitively, if the ‘tail’ of the history ht is
(ft, At, st), the SEU draw (qt, ut) in period t has to rationalize the choice of ft from At.
For every pair of acts gt, rt we can then define gthtrt if gt is weakly better than rt for
every possible draw of SEU from N(ft, At) that happens with positive probability under
the respective DR-SEU representation. Note that this implies that ht is potentially
incomplete. The following definition adds tie-breaking considerations to the intuition we
just explained.
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Definition 13. For each t ≤ T − 1 and ht = (ht−1, At, ft, st) ∈ Ht we define the relation
ht on Ft as follows: For any gt, g′t ∈ Ft we have gthtrt if there exist sequences in Ft
with gnt→mgt and rnt→mrt such that
ρt
(
1
2
ft +
1
2
rnt ,
1
2
At +
1
2
{gnt , rnt }, st
∣∣∣∣ht−1) = 0, for all n.
Finally, let ∼ht ,ht be the indifference and strict part of ht.
Because of Axiom 0 in DR-SEU, specifically the no unforeseen contingencies (NUC)
assumption, the preferenceht doesn’t depend on the realization of the period−t objective
state st as long as that state has positive probability under h
t−1.
We now put the additional axioms characterizing Evolving SEU on ht .
Axiom 4: Separability. For all t ≤ T − 1, gt, rt ∈ Ft we have gt ∼ht rt whenever
gAt (st) =
d rAt (st) and g
Z
t (st) =
d rZt (st) for all st ∈ St.
This says that whenever the marginal distributions over the current prize lottery and
continuation menu of two acts after a history ht are the same then the two acts are
indifferent under the revealed preference after the history. It ensures that Bernoulli utility
ut has the form
ut(zt, At+1) = vt(zt) + δVt(At+1). (5)
Axiom 4 allows the definition of a history-dependent menu preference over continuation
menus.
Definition 14. Fix a zt ∈ Z. Take a ht ∈ Ht and define an ex-post menu preference ht
over At+1 by
At+1htBt+1, if δ(zt,At+1)htδ(zt,Bt+1).
We now add other menu preference axioms to shape the menu preference V from (5)
into the form needed for (3). The next three Axioms are standard.
Axiom 5: Monotonicity. Whenever At+1 ⊆ Bt+1 it holds Bt+1htAt+1.
Axiom 6: Indifference to Timing. For any At+1, Bt+1 and α ∈ (0, 1) we have
αAt+1 + (1− α)Bt+1 ∼ht αAt+1 + (1− α)Bt+1.
Axiom 7: Menu Non-Degeneracy. There existsAt+1, Bt+1 such that δ(zt,Bt+1)htδ(zt,At+1)
for all zt.
Before stating the next axiom, we introduce an operation on menus which produces for
every menu a constant menu containing all the lotteries in its acts. Formally, in a setting
with AA-acts from F for a menu A ⊂ F define the menu of constant acts from A¯ as follows.
A¯ = {g ∈ F : g constant act with g(s) = f(s′) for some f ∈ A, s, s′ ∈ S}.
The following axiom ensures that the menu preference ht of Definition 14 can be rep-
resented by Expected Utility preferences with stochastic but state-independent Bernoulli
utilities.
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Axiom 8: Weak Dominance. For any At+1 ∈ At+1 it holds A¯t+1htAt+1.
Intuitively, from the perspective of the end of period t and compared to the menu At+1,
the menu A¯t+1 offers insurance w.r.t. the stochasticity of both beliefs and tastes as ex-post
in t+ 1 the agent can choose her best lottery from any act in At+1 whereas in At+1 which
lottery the agent ultimately faces depends on the realization of the objective state st+1.
Menu Finiteness (technical). Next we define what it means for a menu preference
to be finite. This is a technical property we need for tractability.
Definition 15. For  a menu preference over some set of prizes X say that it satisfies
Finiteness if there exists K ∈ N such that for menu A there exists B ⊂ A with |B| ≤ K
and so that B ∼ A.
Axiom 9: Finiteness of Menu preference For all ht ∈ Ht, the menu preference on
At+1 derived from ht satisfies Finiteness as in Definition 15.
Finally, we add the sophistication axiom which ensures that the agent correctly predicts
her future beliefs and tastes. Intuitively, if enlarging the menu At+1 to Bt+1 is valuable for
the agent just after the realization of history ht and her beliefs about the future evolution
of her preferences are correct, this is because there are possible draws of SEUs in period
t+ 1 for which elements in Bt+1 \ At+1 are optimal. This should be then reflected in the
ht−dependent stochastic choice from Bt+1.
Axiom 10: Sophistication For all t ≤ T − 1, ht ∈ Ht and At+1 ⊂ Bt+1 ∈ A∗t+1(ht),
the following are equivalent
A. ρt+1(ft+1, Bt+1, st+1|ht) > 0 for some ft+1 ∈ Bt+1 \ At+1 and some st+1 ∈ St+1.
B. Bt+1htAt+1.
Theorem 2. For a dynamic aSCF ρ satisfying a DR-SEU representation the Axioms
4-10 are equivalent to the existence of an Evolving SEU representation.
Next, we note down a special cases of the Evolving SEU representation which can
be used to model data from a population of agents with deterministic but heterogeneous
tastes who are learning about payoff-relevant objective states. Thus, uncertainty about
taste resolves in the first period, i.e. after an agent from the population is ‘drawn’, but
there is persistent uncertainty about payoff-relevant objective states.
Example 3: Stochastic taste only in period zero. If we replace Axiom 8 with the
following Strong Dominance axiom32 then we get a version of Evolving SEU, where tastes
are stochastic only in t = 0 and the profile of future tastes is completely determined after
every period-0 history.
32This is what [Dillenberger et al ’14] call Dominance in their main theorem.
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Axiom 8’: Strong Dominance For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and ht ∈ Ht we have:
If ft+1 ∈ At+1 and {ft+1(st+1)}ht{gt+1(st+1)} for all st+1 ∈ St+1 then
At+1 ∼ht At+1 ∪ {gt+1}.
Intuitively, if the Bernoulli utility is deterministic and if an act is better than another
uniformly across all states, adding the dominated act to a menu which contains the
dominating act doesn’t make the menu more valuable.
Proposition 3. For a dynamic aSCF ρ satisfying a DR-SEU representation the Axioms
4-7,8’,9 and 10 are equivalent to the existence of an Evolving SEU representation where
stochasticity of tastes is resolved at the end of period 0.
Finally, we note a special case of DR-SEU involving a sophisticated agent but which
doesn’t have an Evolving SEU representation.
Example 4. [Epstein ’06] and [Epstein et al ’08] consider a sophisticated agent who
experiences temptation in beliefs and therefore updates her beliefs about objective states
in a subjective way not necessarily conforming to Bayesian updating with respect to the
true data-generating process. The ex-post choice versions of these models are special cases
of DR-SEU and satisfy C-Determinism*, but they violate Axiom 5 (Monotonicity), which
is necessary for an Evolving SEU representation.33
3.2.3 Gradual Learning
Gradual Learning imposes additional restrictions on the evolution of Bernoulli utilities of
an Evolving SEU representation: the agent is learning about a fixed taste.
To explain the three additional Axioms which lead to the Gradual Learning represen-
tation we introduce some notation.
For some t ≤ T−1 and given a sequence lt, . . . , lT ∈ ∆(Z) of consumption lotteries, let
the stream of lotteries (lt, . . . , lT ) ∈ ∆(Xt) ⊂ Ft be the period-t lottery that at every period
τ ≥ t yields consumption according to lτ . Formally, for any consumption lottery l ∈ ∆(Z)
and menu of constant acts At+1 ∈ Act+1 define (l, At+1) ∈ ∆(Xt+1) to be the lottery
which has stochastic consumption now and fixed continuation with probability one.34
Then (lt, . . . , lT ) = (lt, At+1) ∈ ∆(Xt) is defined recursively from period T backwards by
AT = {lT} ∈ AT and As = {(ls, As+1)} ∈ As for all s = t + 1, . . . , T − 1. We write
(lt, . . . , lτ ,m, . . . ,m) if lt+1 = · · · = lT for some m ∈ ∆(Z) and τ ≥ t.
Axiom 11: Stationary Preference over Lotteries [FIS]. For all t ≤ T−1, l,m, n ∈
∆(Z) and ht we have
(l, n, . . . , n)ht(m,n, . . . , n) if and only if (n, l, . . . , n)ht(n,m, n, . . . , n).
Intuitively, if and only if the felicity vt today is just the average of the future felicity vt+1
tomorrow, it holds true from today’s perspective that postponing the choice between two
lotteries by a period results in the same ranking as for the case that the choice is made
immediately.
33The model in [Epstein et al ’08] features infinite horizon so the statement above holds for its finite
horizon version.
34This is similar to the definition in section 4.3 of [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17].
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For the second axiom, just as in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17] for lotteries l,m ∈ ∆(Z),
we say they are ht-non-indifferent if (l, n . . . , n) 6∼ht (m,n, . . . , n) for some n ∈ ∆(Z).
Moreover, to avoid tautologies we require a non-degeneracy condition.
Condition 1: Consumption Non-degeneracy For all t ≤ T − 1 and ht, there exists
ht−non-indifferent l,m ∈ ∆(Z).
Axiom 12: Constant Intertemporal Trade-off [FIS]. For all t, τ ≤ T−1, if l,m are
ht−non-indifferent and lˆ, mˆ are gτ -non-indifferent, then for all α ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ ∆(Z):
(l,m, n, . . . , n) ∼ht(αl + (1− α)m,αl + (1− α)m,n, . . . , n)
⇐⇒
(lˆ, mˆ, n, . . . , n) ∼gτ (αlˆ + (1− α)mˆ, αlˆ + (1− α)mˆ, n, . . . , n).
This ensures that the discounting factor δ from the Evolving SEU representation is unique.
Finally, we note down the classical axiom which gives δ < 1.
Axiom 13: Impatience [FIS]. For all t ≤ T − 1, ht and l,m, n ∈ ∆(Z),
if (l, n, . . . , n)ht(m,n, . . . , n), then (l,m, n, . . . , n)ht(m, l, n, . . . , n).
The characterization result for Gradual Learning is then as follows.
Theorem 3. Assume the aSCF ρ satisfies an Evolving SEU model and assume Condition
1 is satisfied. Then Axioms 11-13 are equivalent to the existence of a Gradual Learning
representation for ρ.
3.3 Uniqueness
The following Proposition proved in Section 4 of the online appendix shows that all
three representations are unique up to positive affine transformations of the Bernoulli
utilities the agent uses to evaluate lotteries over the respective consequence spaces Xt
as well as up to relabeling of the states of the world ω and of the objective states st.
The characterization of uniqueness is a prerequisite for the comparative static exercises
of Section 4. The results mirror closely the identification in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17]
adapted to our more general setting with agents who hold (possibly incorrect) beliefs
about payoff-relevant states.
Proposition 4. 1) Suppose that a dynamic aSCF ρ admits two DR-SEU representations
(Ω,F∗, µ, (Ft, (qt, ut), st, (qˆt, uˆt))0≤t≤T ) and (Ω′,F ′∗, µ′, (F ′t, (q′t, u′t), s′t, (qˆ′t, uˆ′t))0≤t≤T ).
Then there exists a bijection φt : Ft→F ′t and Ft-measurable functions αt : Ω→R++
and βt : Ω→R such that for all ω ∈ Ω:
(i) µ(F0(ω)) = µ′(φ0(F0(ω))) and µ(Ft(ω)|Ft−1(ω)) = µ′(φt(Ft(ω))|φt(Ft−1(ω))) if t ≥
1;
(ii) q′t ≡ qt for all t ≥ 1, ut(ω) = αt(ω)u′t(ω′) + βt(ω) whenever ω′ ∈ φt(Ft(ω));
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(iii) µ((qˆt, uˆt) ∈ Bt(ω)|Ft(ω)) = µ′((qˆ′t, uˆ′t) ∈ φt(Bt(ω))|F ′t(φt(ω))) for any Bt(ω) =
{(pt, vt) ∈ ∆(St) × RXt : ft ∈ M(M(At, (qt(ω), qt(ω)), pt, vt))} for some ft ∈ At,
At ∈ At.
2) If ρ admits two Evolving-SEU representations then in addition to (i)-(iii) above we
have
(iv) αt(ω) = α0(ω)
(
δˆ
δ
)t
, for all ω ∈ Ω and t ≥ 0;
(v) vt(ω) = αt(ω)v
′
t(ω
′) + γt(ω) whenever ω′ ∈ φt(Ft(ω)), where γT (ω) = βT (ω) and
γt(ω) = βt(ω)− δE[βt+1|Ft(ω)] if t ≤ T − 1.
3) If ρ has two Gradual Learning Representations and satisfies Condition 1, then in
addition to (i)-(v) the following holds
(vi) δ = δ′
(vii) βt(ω) =
1−δT−t+1
1−δ E[βT |Ft(ω)].
1) shows that agent’s choices uniquely identify the evolution of her private information
in both relevant dimensions: tastes and beliefs. The lack of identification for the Bernoulli
utility functions ut is unavoidable. Intuitively, when one rescales the Bernoulli utilities
by a factor which depends only on information up to time t, the sets of maximal elements
M(At; qt, ut) don’t change.
2) shows that the Evolving SEU model allows for stronger identification of the Bernoulli
utilities. The scaling factor of Bernoulli utilities needs to be measurable with respect to
the information available at t = 0. This is because in the Evolving SEU model the utility
of the continuation problem enters cardinally into the overall utility of choosing an act
from a menu. One can then use the same information, namely that available in period
t = 0, to build a measuring rod with which utilities can be compared across periods.
Obviously, the scaling factor αt still depends on the state of the world ω. In a population
interpretation of the observable aSCF this means that different agents may use different
information available at t = 0 to compare utils intertemporally.
3) shows that the Gradual Learning model improves on the identification properties
of the Evolving SEU model because the discount factor is identified uniquely. This is a
consequence of the Constant Intertemporal Trade-Off Axiom. Under that Axiom any pos-
sible scaling of the Bernoulli utilities in addition to depending on time t = 0 information
only, has to be constant over time.
4 Comparative Statics Results
This section offers simple comparative statics results under varying assumptions about the
representations of the observable aSCF. The characterizations are simple because aSCFs
represent very rich data sources.
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4.1 A measure of belief biasedness
If the analyst doesn’t observe anything about the realization of objective states, it is
impossible to discuss correctness of beliefs of the agents. Most of the canonical models
of behavior based only on menu choice as an observable, as in [Dillenberger et al ’14] and
[Krishna, Sadowski ’14] and many others, as well as models of stochastic choice without
observable objective states as in [Lu ’16] cannot address questions of belief biasedness. In
this part we illustrate what is possible if the observable of the analyst consists of aSCFs.
For simplicity we assume there are best and worst prizes which coincide for all agents
considered: that is, constant acts f, f¯ such that for every aSCF ρ considered it holds:
for every f 6= f we have ρ¯(f, {f, f}) = 1 and for every f 6= f¯ we have ρ¯(f, {f¯, f}) = 0.
Moreover, for simplicity we assume the agents have the same non-stochastic taste u and
focus on comparative statics related to beliefs.35
We assume there is an underlying state of the world ω coming from a finite set Ω.
For example in Example 2 ω may encode gender or ethnicity. An analyst observes two
agents i = 1, 2 who are interested in the realization of an objective payoff-relevant state
s ∈ S. A state of the world ω goes hand in hand with a set of beliefs about the possible
realizations of s for each agent and a true data-generating-process (DGP). The analyst
observes the aSCFs of the agents which are assumed to have the following form.
ρi(f, A, s) =
∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω, s)τ iqi(ω),u(f, A), i = 1, 2. (6)
Here µ ∈ ∆(ω×S) and the tie-breakers τ iqi(ω),u depend only on the realized SEU (qi(ω), u)
of agent i.
We assume µ is either known by the analyst (e.g. an experiment in a lab) or the
analyst gleans it from the data ρi using Theorem 0.
Now assume the analyst fixes a direction q(ω) ∈ ∆(S) for possible biases for every
ω ∈ Ω and is interested in finding out how biased, if at all, the beliefs of the agents are in
the direction {q(ω)}ω∈Ω. The analyst might think that a possible bias for ω corresponds
to some ‘extreme’ q(ω) 6= µ(·|ω).36
A natural way in terms of the aSCF to say that an agent is biased in the direction
{q(ω)}ω∈Ω and that, say, agent 1 has uniformly less biased beliefs than agent 2 is to require
the following in terms of the representation.
Definition 16. 1) Agent i’s beliefs are biased toward the direction q := {q(ω)}ω∈Ω if and
only if there exists a vector of weights {a(ω)}ω∈Ω ∈ [0, 1]Ω such that the following holds
35Formally speaking all aSCF/SCF-s in this subsection satisfy C-determinism* – choice is stochastic
because beliefs of an agent are stochastic, besides possible randomness coming from tie-breaking. In this
setting all the machinery of [Lu ’16], esp. the related test acts can be used (see online appendix). The
conditions on the SCFs which imply that the taste of distinct agents are the same are available upon
request.
36For example, if Ω encodes gender and the true DGP is that µ(·|ω) is independent of ω, a possible
extreme bias might be to assume that for ω = male, q(ω) is ‘tilted’ towards more favorable realizations
of the objective state s whereas for ω = female, q(ω) is ‘tilted’ towards more unfavorable realizations of
the objective state s. As Example 1 illustrates, this might be the case with employment data depending
on the vocation and job properties.
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qi(ω) = ai(ω)q(ω) + (1− ai(ω))µ(·|ω) for some a(ω) ∈ [0, 1].
2) Agent 1’s beliefs are uniformly less biased toward q than agent 2’s beliefs if and only
if it holds for every ω ∈ Ω that 0 ≤ a1(ω) ≤ a2(ω) ≤ 1.
Figure 3 helps describe the definition.
q
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(ω)
s
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s
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Figure 3: In state ω agent 1 has beliefs more aligned to true DGP than agent 2.
The associated menu preference approach from [Lu ’16] provides a way to identify the
weights of the bias in some direction q.
Definition 17 ([Lu ’16]). Given ρ¯, let the associated menu preference ρ¯ be given by the
utility function on menus Vρ¯ : A→[0, 1] with
Vρ¯(A) =
∫ 1
0
ρ¯(A,A ∪ {αf + (1− α)f¯})da.
For a fixed weight in α ∈ [0, 1] the value ρ¯(A,A∪{αf+(1−α)f¯}) gives the probability
that an element of A beats the act αf + (1− α)f¯ , that is, the probability that the agent
prefers items out of the menu A instead of the test act with weight α on the worst prize.
Intuitively speaking, a menu is more valuable in the associated menu preference of a SCF
if in the aggregate its elements are more preferred than test acts αf + (1− α)f¯ . [Lu ’16]
shows that, up to tie-breaking considerations, every stochastic choice function as ρ¯ can be
characterized through its associated menu preference Vρ¯. Thus, except for tie-breaking, ρ¯
contains no more information about the agent than Vρ¯ does.
Given the direction of bias q define for every weight of biases a : Ω→[0, 1] the associated
menu preference where the agent gives weight a(ω) to the belief q(ω) whenever the state
of the world Ω is realized.
Va(A) =
∫
Ω
max
f∈A
[a(ω)q(ω) + (1− a(ω))µ(·|ω)] · (u ◦ f)µ(dω).
This gives a map ψq : [0, 1]
Ω→{menu preferences}.37 Intuitively, one can interpret any
element a ∈ [0, 1]Ω as a vector of degrees of biasedness towards q.
37The image of this map can naturally be identified with value functions of menu preferences.
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Note that the construction of the map ψq comes directly from the data: the aSCF-s
ρi, i = 1, 2 give µ(·|ω) (or the analyst knows this already) and the analyst picks the bias
vector q. Once can show that once a bias direction q is fixed, every weight vector a defines
a unique menu preference Va.
This allows the following characterization of the degree of belief-biasedness in direction
q in terms of observables/data. Here, recall that the induced menu preference from the
stochastic choice function ρ¯ is also completely constructed from stochastic choice data.
Proposition 5. Assume that the two aSCF ρi, i = 1, 2 are as in (6) and consider a vector
of biases q ∈ ∆(S)Ω. It holds:
A. Agent i’s beliefs are uniformly biased toward the direction q with degree a ∈ [0, 1]Ω
if and only if
ψ−1q (Vρ¯i) = a,
i.e. if and only if a is the image under ψq of the menu preference induced from
stochastic choice.
B. Agent 1’s beliefs are uniformly less biased toward the direction q than agent 2’s
beliefs if and only if
ψ−1q (Vρ¯1) ≤ ψ−1q (Vρ¯2).
Note that by varying q, an analyst can use the induced menu preference of ρ¯i (from
Definition 17) to identify the actual bias direction of an agent whenever her aSCF doesn’t
satisfy the Axiom of Correct Interim Beliefs from Definition 2.
Example 1 continued. In the context of Example 1 from the Introduction, subsection
1.1.1 this Proposition states that stochastic choice data are enough for the analyst to
identify the incorrect beliefs qˆi, i = 1, 2. Namely, assume directions for the biases q(s
′
0) =
(1, 0) and q(s′′0) = (0, 1). These correspond to the ‘extreme’ beliefs that a candidate with
s0 = s
′
0 will always deliver outcome s1 = g and a candidate s0 = s
′′
0 will always deliver
outcome s1 = b. The Proposition delivers then a(s
′
0) = 2qˆ1 − 1 and a(s′′0) = 1 − 2qˆ2 so
that whenever a : S0→[0, 1] is identified from data the analyst can recover the incorrect
beliefs qˆi, i = 1, 2.
An alternative to the vector of weights a ∈ [0, 1]Ω on biases is to require instead a uniform
weight a ∈ [0, 1] on biases which is independent of the realization of the characteristic ω.
The conditions on the induced menu preferences identifying the bias a are then simpler
than in Proposition 16.38 Nevertheless, in applications, the bias weights will usually differ
according to the realization of the characteristic ω. For example, one might expect in some
cases the agent to use the correct conditional DGP µ(·|ω) and in other cases of realized
ω-s to use a very biased belief much closer to an ‘extreme’ q(ω) 6= µ(·|ω). Therefore, here
we have focused on the concept of Definition 16 which allows for this additional flexibility.
38Defining the menu preference of an unbiased agent (a counterfactual) and of a fully biased agent,
the condition of biasedness is that the induced menu preference of the agent is a convex combination of
the menu preferences of the unbiased and fully biased agent and that a corresponds to the weight on the
biased agent.
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4.2 The speed of learning about taste
In this subsection we consider agents in a dynamic setting (T ≥ 1) whose stochastic choice
data satisfy the Gradual Learning model and discuss measures across agents of the speed
of learning about taste. We assume for all agents considered in this subsection that at
time t = 0 their taste is not deterministic. Formally, we require the following conditions
on any aSCF of this section.
Assumptions For all aSCFs in this subsection it holds true:
A. ρ satisfies a Gradual Learning (GL) representation with T ≥ 1 and sequence of
felicities vt, t ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
B. ρ¯0 doesn’t satisfy C-Determinism*.
B. ascertains that there is non-trivial learning about taste for an agent. On the other
hand, due to Sophistication (assumed as part of A.), if an agent learns her future taste
at the end of a period t, her taste remains deterministic in all future periods.
Recall that the preferences ht on continuation menus At+1 for some history ht ∈ Ht
from Definition 14 are derived solely from stochastic choice data. If for an agent her
uncertainty about future taste is resolved after a history ht the derived menu preference
on At+1 derived from ht will satisfy Strong Dominance. On the other hand, Strong
Dominance will be violated for ht whenever an agent’s uncertainty about future taste
doesn’t get resolved after history ht. The same holds if instead of looking at whether
Strong Dominance is satisfied we look at whether C-Determinism* is satisfied.
This suggests a simple way to define the speed of learning about taste of an agent who
satisfies a Gradual Learning model as well as an equally simple way to rank such agents
according to their speed of learning about taste.
Definition 18. 1) Say that an agent learns her future taste after history ht if her derived
menu preference on At+1 from ht satisfies Strong Dominance or equivalently, if ρt+1(·|ht)
satisfies C-Determinism*.39
2) Say that an agent becomes certain of her future taste at time t if she learns her future
taste after every history ht ∈ Ht.
3) Say that agent 1 learns her taste faster than agent 2 if the following implication holds
true for every t ≤ T − 1:
agent 2 becomes certain of her taste at t =⇒ agent 1 becomes certain of her taste at t.
The characterization of these concepts in terms of the GL representation (Definition
8) is as follows.
Proposition 6. 1) Suppose an agent has a GL representation with probability space
(Ω,F∗, µ). Then an agent learns her future taste after history ht if and only if condi-
tional on C(ht) her felicity is deterministic, i.e.
vt+1 is a constant function on C(h
t).
39Equivalence holds under the assumption that the data satisfy the GL representation.
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2) Suppose an agent has a GL representation with underlying probability space (Ω,F∗, µ).
An agent becomes certain of her future taste at time t if and only if her felicity at time t
is independent of the state of the world ω, i.e.
vt+1 is a constant function on all of Ω.
3) Suppose two agents i = 1, 2 have GL representations with underlying probability space
(Ω,F∗, µ) but otherwise may have different filtrations {F it}t≤T and different evolution of
SEUs {(qit, uit)}t≤T for i = 1, 2. Then agent 1 learns her taste faster than agent 2 if and
only if the following implication holds true for every t ≤ T − 1:
v2t+1 is a constant function on all of Ω =⇒ v1t+1 is a constant function on all of Ω.
Example 4. Assume that we have two investors i = 1, 2 facing the same market condi-
tions whose CARA Bernoulli utility over monetary outcomes has the form x 7→ 1− e−γix
where γi is random according to a discrete distribution taking positive values from a finite
set Γ ⊂ [1,+∞). In every period each investor decides whether to invest in a risky project
f , whose outcome is strongly dependent on market conditions (objective state st ∈ R+
drawn anew each period) through f(st) ∼ √st × Uniform{−1, 1}+ st or to pick invest-
ments h(α) whose st-independent outcome satisfies h(α) ∼
√
α × Uniform{−1, 1} + α.
Then according to the above Proposition an analyst has two ways of telling who of the two
investors has learned her parameter γi the earliest. If she only has data on choices from
menus containing only acts of the type h(α) she finds the first time when the choice of
each investor on such menus becomes deterministic. If she only has data of choice among
menus, an indicator that investor 1 learned her preference parameter earlier is that she
starts preferring menus where f is present to menus where f isn’t present earlier in time
than investor 2 does.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a dynamic stochastic choice model general enough to encompass
situations where a subjective expected utility agent has both stochastic taste as well
as stochastic beliefs about the realization of objective payoff-relevant states. Under the
assumption that the analyst has access to data which reveal the agent’s history-dependent
choices as well as the sequence of realizations of objective states we have characterized
axiomatically the case when the analyst can uncover the otherwise arbitrary evolution of
the private information of the agent.
The assumed richness of the data allows the analyst to test whether the agent is using
correctly specified beliefs about objective states conditional on her private information and
if not, to determine the bias of the agent as well as to compare different agents according
to their biasedness of beliefs. We have also characterized special cases of the general
representation, Evolving SEU and Gradual Learning, which would have been otherwise
indistinguishable in the static setting. Finally, in the case of Gradual Learning, we have
shown how an analyst is able to detect from data that the agent has stopped learning
about her taste and that therefore the randomness in choice only comes from randomness
in beliefs.
Information acquisition is outside the scope of this model and constitutes the natural
next step in research. E.g. we shouldn’t expect the student in Example 2 not to try
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and actively learn early about her final job market outcome. So it natural to expect
Indifference to Timing to be violated; if an agent tries to actively learn about future
tastes by spending resources after history ht we should expect her to satisfy instead the
weaker condition:
if At+1 ∼ht+1 Bt+1 then αAt+1 + (1− α)Bt+1htAt+1.
That is, since contingent planning costs utility, the agent is averse to it whenever she is
ex-ante indifferent between two decision problems. Introducing information acquisition
in this framework would also allow a better study of misspecified learning.
Other directions to pursue are as follows. We haven’t considered consumption depen-
dence as [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17] do in their DREU model of stochastic taste only.40
Developing ‘systems’ of DR-SEUs coming from agents in strategic situations is also left
for future research, as is characterizing meaningful relaxations of the Sophistication as-
sumption in the Evolving SEU model.
Finally, on another perspective, this paper is about identification and not inference. In
applications data sets are naturally finite. We leave for future research characterizations
of stochastic dynamic behavior when data sets are finite.
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Appendices
The Appendix is organized as follows. Appendix A is devoted to the proof of Theorem 0.
Appendix B describes the Ahn-Sarver representations in the dynamic setting. These are
more convenient for proofs and their equivalence to the Filtration-based representations
from the main text of the paper is proved in the online appendix. Appendix C proves the
existence of so-called separating histories. These are an essential tool in the proof of the
main characterization theorems. Most of Appendix D is devoted to the proof of Theorem
1, the rest of it to the proofs of Section 4. The proof of the rest of the characterization
theorems is in the online appendix. Besides the rest of the auxiliary results, the latter
also contains most of the technical work needed to extend the menu choice literature
to the setting of SEUs, add explicit tie-breaking to [Lu ’16] and beliefs about objective
payoff-relevant states to [Ahn, Sarver ’13].
A Random Subjective Expected Utility with observ-
able objective states (AS-version)
A.1 Separation property for acts - static setting
We prove a separation property for menus of acts, similar to Lemma 1 in [Ahn, Sarver ’13]
(separation property for lotteries).
We start with a trivial remark which will be used extensively in the following.
Remark 2. 1) A SEU preference encoded by (q, u) is constant (i.e. consists of only
indifferences) if and only if u is constant.
2) Two SEU representations (q, u) and (q′, u′) represent the same SEU preference if
and only if q = q′ and u ≈ u′.
The separation property for acts is as follows.
Lemma 1 (Separation property in the AA setting). Let Z ′ be any set (possibly infinite)
and let {(qk, uk) : k = 1, . . . , K} ⊂ ∆(S) × RZ′ be a set of pairwise distinct SEU repre-
sentations s.t. uk is non-constant for all k = 1, . . . , K. Then there is a collection of acts
{fk : k = 1, . . . , K} ⊂ F s.t. qk · uk(fk) > qk · uk(fl) for any distinct l, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Proof. We divide the proof in three steps.
Step 1. Assume first that uk 6≈ ul for all l 6= k and that Z ′ is finite. Then we are in the
setting of Lemma 13 from [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17] and can use a menu of constant
acts to realize the separation property required.
Step 2. Assume now that uk ≈ ul for all l 6= k and that Z ′ is finite. W.l.o.g. we
can assume that uk = ul = u and that im(u) = [0, 1]. Note that in this case it also holds
qk 6= ql for all l 6= k. It is enough in this case to solve the following problem:
(P) For all k find pk ∈ ∆(S) s.t. qk · pk > qk · pl, l 6= k.
Now we are again in the setting of Lemma 13 in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17], if we take
as Bernoulli utilities the qk-s. Formally, it follows qk 6≈ ql whenever S has more than
one element as one can check using uniqueness result in the classical vNM Theorem.
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Thus, Lemma Lemma 13 in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17] gives probability distributions
pk, k = 1, . . . K satisfying (P). Now, we can easily construct the acts needed by the formula
u(fk(s)) = pk(s), s ∈ S, k = 1, . . . , K. Note that this trick works because ∆(S) ⊂ [0, 1]S.
Step 3. Assume now that we are in the general case (qk, uk) 6≈ (ql, ul), l 6= k. There
exists a finite Z ⊂ Z ′ s.t. all uk are non-constant in ∆(Z). We are going to choose acts
f : S→∆(Z). Assume w.l.o.g. that for all k we have im(uk) ⊆ [0, 1]. Divide the Bernoulli
utilities uk in classes r = 1, . . . R ≤ K s.t. if l, k are so that uk ≈ ul they belong to the
same class. Within the same class, normalize the Bernoulli utilities to be equal. Thus,
we can rewrite the SEU preferences given as
{(qrl, ur) : r = 1, . . . R, l = 1 . . . , Kr}.
Now pick constant acts hr, r = 1 . . . , R as in Step 1 with ur(hr) > ur(hr′), r 6= r′. Pick
also within each group r ∈ {1, . . . , R} acts frl, l = 1, . . . , Kr with image in ∆(Z) s.t.
qrl · ur(frl) > qrl · ur(frl′), l 6= l′. We claim that the separating acts we are after can be
taken of the form
λfrl + (1− λ)hr, r = 1, . . . , R; l = 1, . . . , Kr
whenever λ > 0 small enough.
We need to show that there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) with
(P1) qrl · ur(λfrl + (1− λ)hr) > qrl · ur(λfr′l′ + (1− λ)h′r), whenever (r, l) 6= (r′, l′).
Consider first the case r = r′. Then l 6= l′ and (P1) is true for all λ by linearity of the
Bernoulli functions and the choice of frl.
Consider then the case r 6= r′. Given that ur(hr) > ur(hr′) and the linearity of the
Bernoulli functions, for a fixed pair of tuples (r, l) 6= (r′, l′) (P1) becomes true whenever λ
is small enough for that pair. This gives a positive upper bound on λ. Since the number
of pairs (r, l) is finite, overall there exists a 1 > λ > 0 for which (P1) is satisfied for all
distinct pairs (r, l) 6= (r′, l′).
A.2 Proof for the Axiomatization of aSCFs (AS-version)
Pick an element y∗ ∈ X and set U = {u ∈ RX : u(y∗) = 0}.
We first define the AS-version (Ahn-Sarver version) of the representation.
Definition 19. 1) Let ρ be an aSCF for acts in F over ∆(X) where X is a separable
metric space and S, the set of objective states is finite.
We say that ρ admits an AS-version R-SEU representation if there is a triple
(SubS, µ, {((q, u), τq,u) : (q, u) ∈ SubS})
such that
A. SubS is a finite subjective state space of distinct and non-constant SEUs and µ is a
probability measure on SubS × S.
B. For each (q, u) ∈ SubS the tie-breaking rule τq,u is a regular sigma-additive probabil-
ity measure on ∆(S)× U endowed with the respective product Borel sigma-Algebra.
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C. For all f ∈ F, A ∈ A and s ∈ S we have
ρ(f, A, s) =
∑
(q,u)∈SubS
µ(q, u, s)τq,u(f, A), (7)
where τq,u(f, A) := τq,u ({(p, w) ∈ ∆(S)× U : f ∈M(M(A;u, q);w, p)}).
2) We say that the AS-version R-SEU representation has no unforeseen contingencies
if supp(µ(·|q, u)) ⊆ supp(q) for all (q, u) ∈ SubS.
3) We say that the AS-version R-SEU representation has correct interim beliefs if
µ(·|q, u) = q(·) for all (q, u) ∈ SubS.
The next Theorem gives the axiomatization of aSCFs which have an AS-version R-SEU
representation.
Theorem 4. The aSCF ρ on A admits an AS-version R-SEU representation if and only
if it satisfies
A. Statewise Monotonicity
B. Statewise Linearity
C. Statewise Extremeness
D. Statewise Continuity
E. Statewise State Independence
F. Statewise Finiteness
Moreover, it additionally has a No Unforeseen Contingencies representation if and only
if it additionally satisfies No Unforeseen Contingencies. Finally, it has a Correct Interim
Beliefs representation if and only if it additionally satisfies Correct Interim Beliefs.
Proof of Theorem 4. Necessity. Checking this is routine. In particular, one checks
easily that RSSupp(ρ¯) = supp(µ).
Sufficiency. We prove this in several steps.
Step 1. We construct the SCFs ρ¯ from ρ as well as ρ(·, ·|s) for all s ∈ S. Due to the
axioms on ρ all of ρ¯ as well as ρ(·, ·|s), s ∈ S satisfy all axioms from Theorem 1 in the
online appendix. In particular, we have the following representations: for all f ∈ A,A ∈ A
ρ¯(f, A) =
∑
(q,u)∈SubS
ψ(q, u)τq,u(f, A) (8)
and
ρ(f, A|s) =
∑
(q,u)∈SubS(s)
ψs(q, u)τ sq,u(f, A). (9)
with appropriate probability measures ψ and ψs on finite sets of SEUs.
Step 2. Due to simple probability accounting it holds
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ρ¯(f, A) =
∑
s∈S
ρ(f, A|s)ρ(s). (10)
If it were true that supp(ψs) 6⊆ supp(ψ) for some s ∈ S then by use of separating menus
as constructed in Lemma 1 one could come to a contradiction to (10). The same kind
of contradiction argument and use of Lemma 1 leads to exclusion of the case supp(ψ) \
∪s∈Ssupp(ψs) 6= ∅. In all we have established
supp(ψ) = ∪s∈Ssupp(ψs).
In particular, we can extend w.l.o.g. ψs for all s to all of supp(ψ) by setting it to zero
outside of supp(ψs).
Step 3. By a similar mixing argument as in Proposition 2 in the online appendix (see
step 3 there) one can easily show that whenever (q, u) ∈ supp(ψ) ∩ supp(ψs) we have
τ sq,u = τq,u. In particular, we can write the representations for ρ(·, ·|s) as
ρ(f, A|s) =
∑
(q,u)∈SubS
ψs(q, u)τq,u(f, A). (11)
By plugging (11) in (10), rearranging and using the uniqueness result for the AS-representation
of ρ from Proposition 2 in the online appendix we get
ψ(q, u) =
∑
s∈S
ψs(q, u)ρ(s), (q, u) ∈ supp(ψ). (12)
By setting µ(q, u, s) = ψs(q, u)ρ(s) we define a probability measure over SubS × S
whose marginal over SubS is full support and which satisfies (7).
Step 4. Take a separating menu A¯ = {f(q, u) : (q, u) ∈ supp(ψ)} for supp(ψ). We
show that the following property (P) gives us the representation for correct interim beliefs.
(P ) ρ(·|f(q, u), A¯) = q(·), (q, u) ∈ supp(ψ).
Claim. (P) implies the representation with correct interim beliefs.
Proof of Claim. For the menu A¯ and each (q, u) ∈ supp(ψ) we have
ψs(q, u) = ρ(f(q, u), A¯|s) = ρ(f(q, u), A¯, s)
ρ(s)
=
ρ(s|f(q, u), A¯)ρ¯(f(q, u), A¯)
ρ(s)
=
q(s)ψ(q, u)
ρ(s)
.
(13)
Here, only in the last equality we have used (P) and the definition and representation of
ρ¯ from Theorem 1 in the online appendix. We write this as the identity
(!) ρ(s)ψs(q, u) = q(s)ψ(q, u).
Summing (!) w.r.t. (q, u) we get the identity (!!) ρ(s) =
∑
(q,u)∈SubS ψ(q, u)q(s) for
all s ∈ S and thus a unique solution for ψs in (13). It is then trivial to see that the
representation holds because of (11) and (!!).
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Step 5. In this step we show that (P) is implied by Correct Interim Beliefs.
Denote in general for each q ∈ ∆(S) such that (q, u) ∈ supp(µ) for some u ρ(·|f(q, u), A¯) =
qˆ(q, u)(·).
Suppose by contradiction that there exists some (q, u) ∈ supp(µ) with ρ(·|f(q, u), A¯) 6=
q(·). If it holds for some uˆ that (qˆ(q, u), uˆ) ∈ supp(µ) = RSSupp(ρ¯) then we know that
(qˆ(q, u), uˆ) 6∈ N(A¯, f(q, u))∩RSSupp(ρ¯) = {(q, u)} as A¯ is separating for RSSupp(ρ¯) and
qˆ(q, u) 6= q, which implies (q, u) 6≈ (qˆ(q, u), uˆ). But clearly |N(A¯, f(q, u))∩RSSupp(ρ¯)| =
|{(q, u)}| = 1.
Overall it follows that Correlated Interim Belief axiom is violated at the choice data
(f(q, u), A¯).
Step 6. We show that the following property (P!) gives us the representation for no
unforeseen contingencies.
(P !) supp(ρ(·|f(q, u), A¯)) ⊂ supp(q(·)), (q, u) ∈ supp(ψ).
Claim. (P!) implies the representation with unforeseen contingencies.
We look at (13), but leave out the final equality. The Claim follows immediately.
Step 7. In this step we show that (P!) is implied by No Unforeseen Contingencies.
Suppose by contradiction that there exists some (q, u) ∈ supp(ψ) = RSSupp(ρ¯) with
supp(ρ(·|f(q, u), A¯)) 6⊆ supp(q(·)). Pick again a separating menu for RSSupp(ρ¯) and
note that |N(A¯, f(q, u)) ∩ RSSupp(ρ¯)| = |{(q, u)}| = 1. Overall it follows that the No
Unforeseen Contingencies axiom is violated for the choice data (f(q, u), A¯).
We note down uniqueness.41
Proposition 7. The AS-version REU-representation for an aSCF ρ is essentially unique
in the sense that for each two representations the only degree of freedom is positive affine
transformations of the Bernoulli utilities of elements in the support of the measures over
SEUs.
Proof. For the case of CIB this follows directly from Proposition 2 in the online appendix
applied to the SCF corresponding to the aSCF.
For the case of NUC, if there are two different representations for ρ with respective
measures µ, µ′ it follows from Proposition 2 in the online appendix that the marginals
are equal:
∑
s µ(q, u, s) =
∑
s µ
′(q, u, s) for all (q, u, s). In particular, up to equivalence
classes of positive affine transformations of the Bernoulli utility functions the support of
these two marginals in ∆(S) × RX is equal for the two measures. Assume then w.l.o.g.
the same normalization for both supports. Taking now a separating menu A¯ for the SEUs
in the support of the two measures µ, µ′, we have from the representation property that
ρ(f(q, u), A¯, s) = µ(q, u, s) = µ′(q, u, s) for all s.
This concludes the proof.
Proof for Proposition 1. Sufficiency. Define the SCF on ∆(X) by the formula42
41The online appendix shows equivalence between AS-based representations and Filtration-based rep-
resentations.
42Here a slight abuse of notation as we haven’t written down the isomorphism between constant menus
of acts and menus of lotteries, but the context gives clarity.
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τ(f, A) = ρ(f, A), A is menu of constant acts.
Note that Theorem 1 in the online appendix gives with some slight abuse of notation
τ(f, A) =
∑
(q,u)∈SubS for some q
µ(q, u)τq,u({(p, w) ∈ ∆(S)× U : f ∈M(M(A; q, u); p, w)}).
Since the beliefs play no role in the decision of the agent (all acts are constant), one can
rewrite this as
τ(f, A) =
∑
u∈piu(SubS)
µ(u)τ ′u({w ∈ U : f ∈M(M(A;u);w)}),
where µ(u) =
∑
q:(q,u)∈SubS µ(q, u) > 0 and τ
′
u =
∑
q:(q,u)∈SubS
µ(q,u)
µ(u)
τq,u. Note that τ
′
u is a
regular tie-breaker for lotteries.43
Obviously this gives an S-based REU representation as in Theorem 4 of [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17].
C-Determinism* implies then directly that τ has only one state in the sense of the S-based
representation from [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17].44 In particular, u ≈ v for all u, v ∈ U
such that (q, u), (p, v) ∈ supp(µ) for some q, p ∈ ∆(S).
Necessity. Consider a menu of constant acts A. Then for all (q, u), (p, u) ∈ supp(µ)
we have M(A;u, q) = M(A; v, u) =: M(A, q), so that by a small abuse of notation which
uses the fact that the menu A is constant we can write
ρ(f, A) =
∑
(q,u)∈SubS
µ(q)τq({w ∈ U : f ∈M(M(A;u);w)}).
The existence of a best constant act f¯ means u(f¯) > u(f) whenever f 6= f¯ and f also
constant.
Note now that for each g ∈ A, g 6= f we have for either u(af + (1 − a)f¯) > u(g) or
u(af + (1− a)f¯) < u(g) for all a < 1 near enough to a. It follows that
ρ(af + (1− a)f¯ ;A \ {f} ∪ {af + (1− a)f¯}) ∈ {0, 1}, for all a < 1 near enough to 1.
Thus C-Determinism* is satisfied.
We skip writing down a statement and proof of a Proposition connecting AS-version
representations with the representations in Definition 2 (filtration form) since it will be
subsumed in the more general arguments in Section 4 of the online appendix.
B AS-Based Representations for the dynamic setting
The proofs in this appendix are done in the AS-version of the representations. Here we
explain what these are. The online appendix then establishes the equivalence between
the two types of representations.
43Here, the w breaking ties from M(A, u) is drawn as follows: first draw a (q, u) where (q, u) has
probability µ(q,u)µ(u) and then, draw (conditionally independently across the (q, u)-s) w according to the
marginal of τq,u on U . This works because the tie-breakers are preference-based.
44Otherwise one arrives easily at a contradiction through separating lotteries to either µ(u) > 0 for all
u or to the C-Determinism* Axiom.
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B.1 Dynamic Random Subjective Expected Utility (DR-SEU)
Definition 20. We say that a history-dependent family of aSCF ρ = (ρ0, . . . , ρT ) has a
DR-SEU representation if there exists
• a finite objective state space S and a collection of partitions St, t = 1 . . . , T of S
such that St is a refinement of St−1.
• a finite collection of states of the world Θt, t = 0, . . . , T (an element is of the
type (qt, ut, st) ∈ ∆(St) × RXt × St). The sequence Θt, t ≤ T has a partitional
structure and there are no repetitions: each element (qt, ut, st) is indexed by the
predecessors (q0, u0, s0; . . . ; qt−1, ut−1, st−1).45 Moreover we have the restriction that
sk ∈ supp(qk).
• a collection of probability kernels
ψk : Θk−1→∆(Θk)
for k = 0, . . . , T 46 with a typical element in the image written as ψ
qk−1,uk−1,sk−1
k . In
particular, the probability that (qk, uk, sk) is realized after θk−1 occurs is ψ
θk−1
k (qk, uk, sk).
• a sequence of tie-breakers: for all t = 0, . . . , T a regular probability measure τ(qt,ut)
over ∆(St)× RXt, for all (qt, ut) = piqu(θt) for some θt ∈ Θt.
such that the following two conditions hold.
DR-SEU 1
(a) every (qt, ut) ∈ piqu
(
supp(ψ
θt−1
t )
)
represents a non-constant SEU preference.
(b) supp(ψ
θt−1
t ) ∩ supp(ψθ
′
t−1
t ) = ∅ whenever θt−1 6= θ′t−1, both in Θt−1.47
(c) ∪θt−1supp(ψθt−1t ) = Θt.
(d) either (correct interim beliefs) The kernels ψ satisfy ψ
θk−1
k (sk|qk, uk) = qk(sk)
or otherwise (no unforeseen contingencies) supp
(
ψ
θk−1
k (·|qk, uk)
)
⊂ supp(qk).
DR-SEU 2
The SCF ρt after a history h
t−1 = (A0, f0, s0; . . . , At−1, ft−1, st−1) is given by
ρt(st, ft, At|ht−1) =
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
[∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)
]
·ψθt−1t (θt)τpiqu(θt)(ft,At)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
[∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)
] .
45This means that there can be repetitions in terms of the SEUs (qt, ut) but whenever this happens a
different st is realized.
46With the obvious conventions for k = 0.
47This implies, that whenever pis(θt−1) = pis(θt−1) and two elements θt ∈ supp(ψθ
′
t−1
t ), θ
′
t ∈ supp(ψ
θ′t−1
t )
with piqs(θt) = piqs(θ
′
t) we must have ut 6= u′t.
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B.2 Evolving Subjective Utility (Evolving SEU)
The Evolving Subjective Expected Utility representation is a special case of DR-SEU.
In the pre-choice situation in period t when the agent knows (qt, ut) = piqu(θt) and
satisfies the Evolving SEU representation she evaluates acts according to the following
SEU functional
Eqt [ut(ft)] = Est∼qt [ut(ft(st))] = Est∼qt [vt(fZt (st))] + δV
piqu(θt)
t (f
A
t ). (14)
Here V
piqu(θt)
t (f
A
t ) is defined in two steps. First we define
V θtt (At+1) =
∫
max
ft+1∈At+1
Eqt+1 [ut+1(ft+1)]dψ
θt
t+1(qt+1, ut+1). (15)
This gives the value of a menu when the agent knows the menu, but not the SEU with
which it will evaluate the acts. This is the situation just after (zt, At+1) is known to the
agent at the end of period t.
A moment before, i.e. when the agent doesn’t know st yet the value of f
A
t is given by
V
piqu(θt)
t (f
A
t ) :=
∑
st
∑
At+1∈suppfAt (st)
qt(st)f
A
t (st)(At+1)V
θt
t (At+1) =:
∑
st
qt(st)V
θt
t (f
A
t (st)).
(16)
Note that the uncertainty that is integrated out in (16) is the objective one concerning
st and that we have used equation (15) to define the extension of V
θt
t to lotteries over
menus.48
We can rewrite this in integral form as follows.
V
piqu(θt)
t (f
A
t ) =
∫
max
ft+1∈At+1
Eqt+1 [ut+1(ft+1)]dψ
piqu(θt)
t+1 (qt+1, ut+1),
where ψ
piqu(θt)
t+1 (qt+1, ut+1) :=
∑
st
qt(st)ψ
θt
t+1(qt+1, ut+1) =
∑
st,st+1
qt(st)ψ
θt
t+1(qt+1, ut+1, st+1).
B.3 Gradual SEU-Learning.
Gradual SEU-learning is the case of Evolving SEU with the additional requirement that
her sequence of expected utility functionals from consumption vt, t = 0, . . . T form a
Martingale. In the following we use the projection piv, which for a ut as in (14) gives the
corresponding vt.
Normalize vt(p¯) = 0 for all t where p¯ is the uniform lottery over Z. This is possible
because Z is assumed to be finite for the dynamic setting. After a θt = (qt, ut, st) it has
to hold for the sequence piv(θt) from the Evolving SEU representation
piv(θt) =
1
δ
∑
(qt+1,ut+1)∈piqu(Θt+1)
ψθtt+1(qt+1, ut+1) · piv(ut+1) =
1
δ
E[piv(θt+1)|θt]. (17)
48I.e. agent is Expected Utility w.r.t. lotteries over menus.
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C Separating histories
We first define histories consistent with a state θt. Then we define separating histories
for a fixed state θt. The main result of this section establishes the existence of separating
histories (Lemma 7).
Let us assume that we have an aSCF ρ which satisfies DR-SEU 1. We define the
predecessor of a state θ as pred(θt) = (θ0, . . . , θt−1).
Definition 21. For a state θt = (qt, ut, st) denote by pred(θt) = (θ0, . . . , θt−1) the unique
predecessor of θt from
∏t−1
i=0 Θi.
The concept is well-defined because of DR-SEU 1 (a)-(b).
Definition 22. Given a history ht = (A0, f0, s0;A1, f1, s1; . . . ;At, ft, st) say that θt is
consistent with ht if for the unique predecessor of θt, given by (θ0, . . . , θt−1) we have
t∏
k=0
τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak) · ψθk−1k (θk) > 0.
Here we use the convention ψ
θ−1
0 := ψ0.
Note that multiple states θt can be consistent with the same history h
t.
Define
QUθk(Ak+1, fk+1, sk+1) = {(qk+1, uk+1) : (qk+1, uk+1, sk+1) ∈ supp(ψθkk+1) and fk+1 ∈M(Ak+1; qk+1, uk+1)}.
This is the set of SEU-s (qk+1, uk+1) occurring right after θk which can rationalize the
data (Ak+1, fk+1, sk+1).
For time t = 0 define
QU0(A0, f0, s0) = {(q0, u0) : (q0, u0, s0) ∈ supp(ψθ0−1) and f0 ∈M(A0; q0, u0)}.
We prove first the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 (Pendant to Lemma 1 in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17]). Fix any θt and its pre-
decessor (θ0, . . . , θt−1). Suppose ht = (B0, g0, s0; . . . ;Bt, gt, st) satisfies QUθk−1(Bk, gk, sk) =
{piqu(θk)}. Then for all k = 0, . . . , t, only θk in Θk can be consistent with hk.
Proof. Fix any l = 0, . . . , t and consider θ′l ∈ Θl \ {θl} with pred(θ′l) = (θ′0, . . . , θ′l−1).
Let k ≤ l be smallest such that θ′k 6= θk. Then piqu(θ′k) ∈ piqu(supp(ψθk−1k )). So
QUθk−1(Bk, gk, sk) = {(qk, uk)} (which is assumed) implies either (A) (qk, uk) 6= (q′k, u′k)
or (B) (qk, uk) = (q
′
k, u
′
k), sk 6= s′k (otherwise contradiction to θk 6= θ′k).
In the case of (B) the definition of the QU-sets implies then that s′k 6∈ supp(qk), i.e.
q′k(s
′
k) = 0. In the case of (A) the definition of the QU-sets implies gk 6∈ M(Bk; q′k, u′k),
i.e. τq′k,u′k(gk, Bk) = 0. Overall we have that θ
′
l is not consistent with h
l.
Next we show that θl is consistent with h
l. Note that from the definition of histories
w.r.t. to some aSCF it follows that ρ(gl, Bl|hl) > 0. DR-SEU 2 then implies
∑
piqu(θ0,...,θt)∈×i≤lSEUi
[
l−1∏
k=0
ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak)
]
· ψθl−1l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl, Al)ql(sl) > 0.
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If it happens that pred(θl) 6= (θ0, . . . , θl−1) then
[∏l−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)
]
· ψθl−1l (θl) = 0 just by
the definition of DR-SEU 1. If otherwise pred(θl) = (θ0, . . . , θl−1) but θl 6= θ′l then we
showed above that
[∏l−1
k=0 qk(pis(θk))τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak)
]
· τpiqu(θl)(fl, Al)ql(sl) = 0.
Definition 23. A separating history for θt with pred(θt) = (θ0, . . . , θt−1) is a history
ht = (B0, g0, s0; . . . ;Bt, gt, st) ∈ H∗t such that QUθk−1(Bk, gk, sk) = {piqu(θk)} for all k ≤ t.
For the case k = 0 we abuse notation and write QU−1(B0, g0, s0) = QU0(B0, g0, s0).
Remark 3. 1) Let At ∈ At arbitrary. After introducing LHI below, one sees easily,
that when mixing a separating history for θt with a deterministic history such that it
has the same projection on objective states as ht−1 one can assume that ht−1 is so that
At ∈ A∗t (ht−1). In particular separating histories are not unique.
2) By definition, θt is the only state in Θt−1 consistent with ht−1 if ht−1 is a separating
history for θt−1.
Write
Dt−1 = {dt−1 ∈ Ht−1 : dt−1 = ({f0}, f0, s0; . . . {ft−1}, ft−1, st−1), fi ∈ Fi},
for the set of histories such that the menu is degenerate in each period and look at its
subset
DCt−1 = {dt−1 ∈ Ht−1 : dt−1 = ({h0}, h0, s0; . . . {ht−1}, ht−1, st−1), hi, i ≤ t−1 are constant acts}.
The latter consists of deterministic histories where the agent faces only constant acts and
thus objective states don’t matter.
Note that given a menu At 6∈ At(ht−1) we can always choose a ht−1 ∈ DCt−1 with
At ∈ supp(hAt−1). Then we can define the extended aSCF as follows.
Definition 24. For a history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, At ∈ At and st ∈ St define
ρh
t−1
t (·, At, st) = ρt(·, At, st|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1),
for some λ ∈ (0, 1], where dt−1 ∈ DCt−1 is so that λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1 ∈ Ht−1(At).49
We prove the extension is well-defined.
Lemma 3. Suppose that ρ satisfies LHI. Fix t ≥ 1, At ∈ At, ht−1 = (A0, f0, s0; . . . , At−1, ft−1, st−1) ∈
Ht−1 and (λ0, . . . , λt−1), (λˆ0, . . . , λˆt−1) ∈ (0, 1]t.
Suppose dt−1 = (h0, {h0}, s0; . . . ;ht−1, {ht−1}, st−1), dˆt−1 = (hˆ0, {hˆ0}, s0; . . . ; hˆt−1, {hˆt−1}, st−1) ∈
DCt−1(At). Then we have
ρt(·, At, st|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1) = ρt(·, At, st|λˆhˆt−1 + (1− λˆ)dˆt−1).50
In particular, ρh
t−1
t is well-defined.
49For this to hold it suffices that At ∈ supp(hAt−1).
50Here the mixture operation for histories is valid for every pair of histories which share the same
sub-history of objective states – the mixture operation only acts on the sub-history of acts and menus.
Recall that mixture of menus is defined through the Minkowski sum.
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Proof. Let k = max{n = 0, . . . , t− 1 : hn 6= hˆn}.
Suppose that k = −1. This means that dt−1 = dˆt−1. If λi > λˆi for i = 0, . . . , t − 1
then the i−th entry of λht−1 + (1 − λ)dt−1 can be rewritten as an appropriate mixture
of the i−th entry of λˆhˆt−1 + (1 − λˆ)dˆt−1 and (Ai, fi, si). If on the other hand λi ≤ λˆi
for i = 0, . . . , t − 1 then the i−th entry of λht−1 + (1 − λ)dt−1 can be rewritten as an
appropriate mixture of the i−th entry of λˆhˆt−1 +(1− λˆ)dˆt−1 and (Ai, fi, si). Starting from
i = 0 and using LHI and working our way up the index i = 0, . . . , t − 1 we see that the
aSCF is unaffected by replacing each entry of λˆht−1 + (1− λˆ)dˆt−1 with its corresponding
entry from λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1. This shows the result for the case k = −1.
Assume now for the induction step that the statement is true for all k ≤ m − 1 for
some 0 ≤ m ≤ t− 1. We show that the claim still holds for k = m.51 Define the following
objects.
Bm =
1
2
Am +
1
2
{hm}, Bˆm = 1
2
Am +
1
2
{hˆm}, rm = 1
2
fm +
1
2
hm, rˆm =
1
2
fm +
1
2
hˆm
gn =
1
2
hn +
1
2
ln, gˆn =
1
2
hˆn +
1
2
ln,
for soon to be specified ln, n = 1, . . . , t − 1. Namely, define ln recursively so that they
satisfy
λnAn+(1−λn){gn}, λˆnAn+(1− λˆn){gˆn}, 1
2
An+
1
2
{hn}, 1
2
An+
1
2
{ˆgn}, {gn} ∈ supp(lAn−1).
Finally augment the constant act lm−1 so that
2
3
Bm +
1
3
{gˆm}, 2
3
Bˆm +
1
3
{gm}, 1
2
{gm}+ 1
2
{gˆm} ∈ supp(lAm−1).
Denote ct−1 := (gn, {gn}, sn)t−1n=0 and cˆt−1 := (gˆn, {gˆn}, sn)t−1n=0 both in DCt−1. Note
that we have λht−1 + (1 − λ)ct−1, λˆht−1 + (1 − λˆ)cˆt−1 ∈ Ht−1(At) by construction. Also,
the last entry at which ct−1 and cˆt−1 differ is m. Thus by repeated application of LHI
we can replace λht−1 + (1 − λ)dt−1 by λht−1 + (1 − λ)ct−1 and λˆht−1 + (1 − λˆ)dˆt−1 by
λˆht−1 + (1− λˆ)cˆt−1. ct−1, cˆt−1 and also satisfy the following relations.
(a) :
1
2
ht−1 +
1
2
dt−1,
1
2
ht−1 +
1
2
dˆt−1 ∈ Ht−1(At),
(b) :
2
3
Bm +
1
3
{hˆm}, {1
2
hm +
1
2
Hˆm} ∈ supp(hAm−1),
(c) :
2
3
Bˆm +
1
3
{hm}, {1
2
hm +
1
2
Hˆm} ∈ supp(hˆAm−1).
These imply immediately
(d) :
(
2
3
Bm +
1
3
{gˆm}, 2
3
rm +
1
3
{gˆm}
)
=
(
2
3
Bˆm +
1
3
{gm}, 2
3
rˆm +
1
3
{gm}
)
=
(
1
3
Am +
2
3
{1
2
hm +
1
2
hˆm}, 1
3
fm +
2
3
(
1
2
hm +
1
2
hˆm)
)
.
51The argument is the same as in the proof of Lemma 15 in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17]. It is based on
the fact that when mixing a history ht−1 with a degenerate history from Dt−1, then the sets of maximizers
N(Ai, fi) doesn’t change.
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Now (a)-(c) imply that the histories(
(
1
2
ht−1 +
1
2
ct−1)−m,
(
2
3
Bm +
1
3
{gˆm}, 2
3
rm +
1
3
{gˆm}, sm
))
and (
(
1
2
ht−1 +
1
2
ct−1)−m,
(
2
3
Bˆm +
1
3
{gm}, 2
3
rˆm +
1
3
{gm}, sm
))
are in Ht−1(At). Moreover, (d) implies that the first history is an entry-wise mixture of
ht−1 with et−1 = (ct−1−m, {12hm+ 12 hˆm)}, 12hm+ 12 hˆm, sm), whereas the second is an entry-wise
mixture of cˆt−1 with eˆt−1 = (dˆt−1−m, {12hm + 12 hˆm)}, 12hm + 12 hˆm, sm).
The base case of the induction (k = −1) gives
ρt(·;At, st|λht−1 + (1− λ)ct−1) = ρt(·;At, st|1
2
ht−1 +
1
2
t−1
ct−1)
and
ρt(·;At, st|λˆht−1 + (1− λˆ)cˆt−1) = ρt(·;At, st|1
2
ht−1 +
1
2
t−1
cˆt−1).
But note that the entry where et−1, eˆt−1 first differ is strictly less than m. Hence applying
the inductive hypothesis we have
ρt
(
·;At, st
∣∣∣∣((12ht−1 + 12ct−1)−m,
(
2
3
Bm +
1
3
{gˆm}, 2
3
rm +
1
3
{gˆm}, sm
)))
=
ρt
(
·;At, st
∣∣∣∣((12ht−1 + 12 cˆt−1)−m,
(
2
3
Bˆm +
1
3
{gm}, 2
3
rˆm +
1
3
{gm}, sm
)))
.
Combining this together with the implication from the base case we get the result.
In the next Lemma we show that the extended aSCF satisfies the formula in DR-SEU
2.
Lemma 4. Suppose that we have an aSCF ρ which has a DR-SEU representation as in
Definition 20 till some period T ∈ N. Then the extended version of ρ as in Definition 24
will satisfy DR-SEU 2, i.e. for all t ≤ T,∀f ′t , A′t and ht−1 = (A0, f0, s0; . . . ;At−1, ft−1, st−1)
and ft, At we have
ρt(st, ft, At|ht−1) =
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
[∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)
]
·ψθt−1t (θt)τpiqu(θt)(ft,At)qt(st)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)
.
Proof. If ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(At) then the claim follows directly from DR-SEU2. Assume thus
that ht−1 6∈ Ht−1(At) and take dt−1 = ({h0}, h0, s0; . . . ; {ht−1}, ht−1, st−1) ∈ DCt−1 with
dt−1 ∈ Ht−1(At) and compatible with the sub-history of objective states so that according
to Definition 24 we can define for some λ ∈ (0, 1)
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1) := ρt(ft, At, st|λht−1 + (1− λ)dt−1).
Note that
(1) the formula depends on the menus and acts chosen only through the tiebreakers
τ .
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(2) dt−1 ∈ Dt−1 implies that for all s ≤ t
fs ∈M(M(As; qs, us), ps, ws)⇐⇒λfs + (1− λ)hs ∈M (M(λAs + (1− λ){hs}; qs, us), ps, ws) .
1) and 2) imply immediately that for all s ≤ t
τqs,us(fs, As) = τqs,us (λfs + (1− λ)hs, λAs + (1− λ){hs}) .
From here the result follows from applying DR-SEU 2 to the history λht−1+(1−λ)dt−1.
We define Θ(ht−1) ⊂ Θt−1 as the set of states θt−1 consistent with ht−1 in the sense of
Definition 22.
Lemma 5. [Pendant to Lemma 14 in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17]] Fix t ∈ {0, . . . , T}
and suppose that we have a DR-SEU representation up to time t. Take any ht−1 =
(A0, f0, s0; . . . ; (At−1, ft−1, st−1) ∈ Ht−1 and At ∈ At. Then the following are equivalent.
A. At ∈ A∗t (ht−1).
B. For each θt−1 ∈ Θ(ht−1) and (qt, ut) ∈ piqu
(
supp(ψ
θt−1
t )
)
we have |M(At; qt, ut)| = 1.
Proof. From A. to B.: We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that there is θt−1 ∈ Θ(ht−1)
and (qt, ut) ∈ piqu(supp(ψθt−1t )) with |M(At; qt, ut)| > 1. Pick any ft ∈ M(At; qt, ut) with
τqt,ut(ft, At) > 0. Since ut is non-constant by DR-SEU 1, we can find lotteries ∆(Xt) with
ut(r) < ut(r¯). Fix a sequence αn ∈ (0, 1) with αn→0 and let fnt = αnδr + (1 − αn)ft as
well as gn
t
= αnδr + (1 − αn)gt and g¯nt = αnδr¯ + (1 − αn)gt for all gt ∈ At \ {ft}. Let
Bnt = {gnt : gt ∈ At\{ft}} and B¯nt = {g¯nt : gt ∈ At\{ft}}. Finally let Bnt = Bnt ∪B¯nt . Then
we have Bnt→mAt \ {ft} and fnt →mft. Furthermore, since |M(At; qt, ut)| > 1 we can pick
gt ∈ At \ {ft} such that qt · ut(g¯nt ) > qt · ut(fnt ). This implies τqt,ut (fnt , Bnt ∪ {fnt }) = 0.
Furthermore, note that for (q′t, u
′
t) ∈ piqu(Θt) \ {(qt, ut)} we always have
N(M(At; q
′
t, u
′
t); ft) = N(M(B
n
t ∪ {fnt }; q′t, u′t); fnt ) ⊇ N(M(Bnt ∪ {fnt }; q′t, u′t); fnt ),
which implies τq′t,u′t(ft, At) ≥ τq′t,u′t(fnt , Bnt ∪{fnt }) for all n. Letting pred(θt−1) = (θ0, . . . , θt−2)
Lemma 4 implies that for all n and all st ∈ St52
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1)− ρt(fnt , Bnt ∪ {fnt }, st|ht−1) =∑
pis(θ
′
0,...,θ
′
t)=(s
′
0,...,s
′
t)
[∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θ′k−1
k (θ
′
k)τpiqu(θ′k)
(fk,Ak)
]
·ψθ
′
t−1
t (θ
′
t)
(
τpiqu(θ′t)
(ft,At)−τpiqu(θ′t)(f
n
t ,B
n
t ∪{fnt })
)
∑
pis(θ
′
0,...,θ
′
t−1)=(s′0,...,s′t−1)
∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θ′
k−1
k (θ
′
k)τpiqu(θ′t)
(ft,At)
≥
∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θt)(ft, At)∑
pis(θ′0,...,θ
′
t−1)=(s
′
0,...,s
′
t−1)
∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θ′k−1
k (θ
′
k)τpiqu(θ′t)(ft, At)
> 0.
The last line doesn’t depend on n so we get
lim sup
n→∞
ρt(f
n
t , B
n
t ∪ {fnt }, st|ht−1) < ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1).
52Note that we need Lemma 4 here because the history ht−1 is not assured to lead to Bnt ∪ {fnt } with
positive probability.
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By Definition 12 we have At 6∈ A∗t (ht−1).
From B. to A.: Suppose At satisfies B. Consider any ft ∈ At, fnt →mft, Bnt→mAt\{ft}.
Consider a θt−1 ∈ Θ(ht−1) and (qt, ut) ∈ piqu(supp(ψθt−1t )).
By 2. we either have M(At; qt, ut) = {ft} or ft 6∈ M(At; qt, ut). In the former case
qt · ut(ft) > qt · ut(gt) for all At 3 gt 6= ft. By linearity we have qt · ut(fnt ) > qt · ut(gnt ) for
all gnt ∈ Bnt for all n large enough.
This implies τqt,ut(ft, At) = limn τqt,ut(f
n
t , B
n
t ∪ {fnt }) = 1. In the case that ft 6∈
M(At; qt, ut) we have similarly qt · ut(ft) < qt · ut(gt) for some At 3 gt 6= ft. But then
linearity implies τqt,ut(ft, At) = limn τqt,ut(f
n
t , B
n
t ∪ {fnt }) = 0.
Overall, for all θt−1 ∈ Θ(ht−1) and (qt, ut) ∈ piqu(supp(ψθt−1t )) it holds τqt,ut(ft, At) =
limn τqt,ut(f
n
t , B
n
t ∪ {fnt }). By looking at the formula in Lemma 4 we see that this implies
for all st ∈ St and all n large enough
ρt(f
n
t , B
n
t ∪ {fnt }, st|ht−1) = ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1).
This finishes the proof.
Before continuing, we register the piece of notation for an arbitrary ft ∈ Ft: suppZ(ft) :=
∪q∈supp(ft)supp(q).
Lemma 6. [Pendant to Lemma 17 in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17].] Suppose we have a
DR-SEU representation till time T . Fix any θt−1 ∈ Θt−1, separating history ht−1 for θt−1
and At ∈ At. Then there exists a sequence Ant→mAt with Ant ∈ A∗t (ht−1).53 Moreover,
given a (q′t, u
′
t) ∈ piqu(supp(ψθt−1t )) and ft ∈ M(At; qt, ut) we can ensure in this construc-
tion that there is fnt (q
′
t, u
′
t) ∈ Ant with fnt (q′t, u′t)→mft such that QUθt−1(Ant , fnt (q′t, u′t), st) =
{(q′t, u′t)} for all st ∈ supp(q′t).
Proof. Let QU(θt−1) := piqu(supp(ψ
θt−1
t )). By Definition 20 there exists a finite set
Yt ⊆ Xt such that (i) for any (qt, ut) ∈ QU(θt−1), ut is non-constant over Yt; (ii) for
any distinct (qt, ut) 6= (q′t, u′t), both in supp(ψθt−1t ), (qt, ut) 6= (q′t, u′t) on Ft(Yt) 54 and (iii)
∪ft∈AtsuppZ(ft) ⊆ Yt.
By (i) and (ii) and Lemma 1 we can find a separating menu Ct = {ft(qt, ut) : (qt, ut) ∈
QU(θt−1)}, i.e. such that for all (qt, ut) ∈ QU(θt−1) we have M(Ct; qt, ut) = {ft(qt, ut)}.
Pick z(qt, ut) ∈ argmaxy∈Ytut(y) for all (qt, ut) ∈ QU(θt−1), write by a small abuse of
notation again z(qt, ut) for the constant act paying out z(qt, ut) with probability one at
each state of the world and define the constant act bt =
1
|Yt|
∑
y∈Yt δy ∈ ∆(Yt). Again, we
denote by bt with a small abuse of notation the constant act which pays out the lottery
bt in each state of the world.
By (i) we have qt ·ut(z(qt, ut)) > qt ·ut(bt) for all (qt, ut) ∈ QU(θt−1). If we then define
fˆt(qt, ut) = αft(qt, ut) + (1 − α)z(qt, ut) we still have qt · ut(fˆt(qt, ut)) > qt · ut(bt) if we
choose α ∈ (0, 1) small enough. This is because of the ‘finiteness’ of all the data going
into the problem. Note also, that if we define Cˆt = {fˆt(qt, ut) : (qt, ut) ∈ QU(θt−1)} we
still have M(Cˆt; qt, ut) = {fˆt(qt, ut)}.
Now pick for each (qt, ut) ∈ QU(θt−1) a ft(qt, ut) ∈ M(At; qt, ut). To also prove
the ‘moreover’ part, pick ft(qt, ut) as required in the ‘moreover’ part. Fix a sequence
n ∈ (0, 1) going to zero. For each n and (qt, ut) ∈ QU(θt−1) := supp(ψθt−1t ) let fnt (qt, ut) =
53Note that because of Remark 3 this is w.l.o.g.
54Recall this denotes the set of acts whose images are contained in ∆(Yt).
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(1 − n)ft(qt, ut) + nfˆt(qt, ut). Moreover, for each gt ∈ At define gnt = (1 − n)gt + nbt.
Finally, take
Ant = {fnt (qt, ut) : (qt, ut) ∈ QU(θt−1)} ∪ {gnt : gt ∈ At}.
Note thatAnt→mAt. Finally, note that by construction we haveM(Ant ; qt, ut) = {fnt (qt, ut)}.
Since by Remark 3, part 2) θt−1 is the only state consistent with ht−1 Lemma 5 and
the construction here imply Ant ∈ A∗t (ht−1), as required. The last required property, i.e.
QUθt−1(A
n
t , f
n
t (qt, ut), st) = {(qt, ut)} for any st ∈ supp(qt) is true by construction.
The next result proves the existence of separating histories.
Lemma 7. [Pendant to Lemma 2 in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17].] For any θt ∈ Θt with
pred(θt) = (θ
′
0, . . . , θ
′
t−1) there always exists a separating history.
Proof. By Lemma 1 and DR-SEU 1 we can construct for Θ0 a menu B0 = {fpiqu(θ0)0 : θ0 ∈
Θ0} ∈ A0 such that QU0(B0, fpiqu(θ0)0 , pis(θ0)) = {piqu(θ0)} for all θ0 ∈ Θ0. Proceeding in-
ductively, again using Lemma 1 and DR-SEU 1, we can find a menu Bk(θk−1) = {fpiqu(θk)k :
piqu(θk) ∈ piqu(supp(ψθk−1k ))} for all θk−1 ∈ Θk−1 such that (!) QUθk−1(Bk(θk−1), fpiqu(θk)k , pis(θk)) =
{piqu(θk)} for all piqu(θk) ∈ piqu(supp(ψθk−1k )).
Moreover, we can assume that Bk+1(θk) ∈ suppA(fpiqu(θk)k ) for all k = 0, . . . , t− 1 and
θk ∈ Θk by mixing each fpiqu(θk)k with the constant act delivering (z,Bk+1(θk)) for a z ∈ Z
fixed throughout. If the mixing puts small enough probability on the constant act in
question, then (!) is preserved.
This implies in particular that ht := (B0, f
θ′0
0 , s
′
0; . . . ;Bt(θ
′
t−1), f
piqu(θt)
t , pis(θt)) ∈ Ht.
Moreover, since QUθ′k−1(Bk(θ
′
k−1), f
piqu(θ′k)
k , pis(θ
′
k)) = {piqu(θ′k)}, it follows by Lemma 2 that
only the state θ′k is consistent with h
k for k = 0, . . . , t. Additionally, by construction for
all (qk, uk) ∈ piqu(supp(ψθ
′
k−1
k )) we have M(Bk(θ
′
k−1); qk, uk) = {f qk,ukk }. Hence, by Lemma
5 we have Bk(θ
′
k−1) ∈ A∗k(hk−1). Since this holds for all k we have overall ht ∈ H∗t . In
summary it follows that ht is a separating history for θt.
D Proof of the main result in the dynamic setting
Here we prove the representation theorem in its AS-version for DR-SEU. The proofs for
the special cases Evolving SEU and Gradual Learning are in the online appendix.
D.1 Proof for DR-SEU
D.1.1 Sufficiency
We proceed by induction on t ≤ T . First consider t = 0. Because of the axioms and
X0 being a separable metric space we have the existence of an AS-version R-SEU rep-
resentation for ρ on H0. Depending on the version of the representation we are looking
at, i.e. whether CIB or NUC is satisfied, we also have the respective property for the
representation at time t = 0. Set SEU0 = {piqu(θ0) : θ0 ∈ Θ0}.
Suppose next that we have the representation for all t′ ≤ t. We now construct the
representation for t+ 1.
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To this end, pick a subjective state θt ∈ Θt and pick an arbitrary separating history
ht(θt) for θt. This exists by Lemma 7. Define
ρθtt+1(·, At+1, st+1) = ρ(·, At+1, st+1|ht(θt)).
Here we use for the right-hand side the extended aSCF, which is well-defined as per
Lemma 24. As per axioms we get a representation
ρθtt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1) =
∑
(qt+1,ut+1)∈SEUθtt+1
ψθtt+1(qt+1, ut+1, st+1)τ(qt+1,ut+1)(ft+1, At+1). (18)
Again, depending on the respective property required by the axioms on beliefs, CIB
or NUC, the kernel ψθtt+1 satisfies the respectively required property in DR-SEU 1.
We set SEUt+1 = unionsqθtSEU θtt+1 and define Θt+1 accordingly by the collection of all
(qt+1, ut+1, st+1) such that (qt+1, ut+1) ∈ SEUt+1 and st+1 ∈ supp(qt+1).55 We extend the
measures ψθtt+1 to all of SEUt+1 by setting them to zero outside of SEU
θt
t+1.
We see that DR-SEU 1 is satisfied by Definition.
With this definition we can rewrite (18) as
ρθtt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1) =
∑
θt+1∈Θt+1
ψθtt+1(θt+1)τpiqu(θt+1)(ft+1, At+1).
Before showing DR-SEU 2, we show that the definition of ρθtt+1 doesn’t depend on the
particular separating history for θt picked in its definition.
Lemma 8. Fix any θt ∈ Θt with pred(θt) = (θ0, . . . , θt−1). Suppose ht = (f0, A0, s0; . . . ; ft, At, st) ∈
Ht satisfies QUθk−1(Ak, fk, sk) = {piqu(θk)} for all k = 0, 1, . . . , t. Then for any At+1 ∈
At+1 and st+1 ∈ St+1 it holds ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|ht) = ρθtt+1(·, At+1, st+1).
Proof. Step 1. Let h˜t = (f˜0, A˜0, s˜0; . . . ; f˜t, A˜t, s˜t) ∈ Ht denote the separating history for θt
used to define ρθtt+1. We first prove the Lemma under the assumption that h
t ∈ H∗t , i.e. that
ht is itself a separating history for θt. Note that since h
t, h˜t ∈ H∗t and QUθk−1(Ak, fk, sk) =
QUθk−1(A˜k, f˜k, s˜k) = {(qk, uk)} Lemma 5 implies thatM(Ak, qk, uk) = {fk} andM(A˜k, qk, uk) =
{f˜k}.
Pick lotteries (r0, . . . , rt) ∈ ∆(X0) × · · · × ∆(Xt) such that At+1 ∈ supp(rAt ) and so
that for all k = 0, . . . , t− 1 it holds
{Bk+1, B˜k+1, Bk+1 ∪ B˜k+1} ⊂ supp(rAk ),
where Bl =
1
3
Al +
1
3
{f˜l} + 13{rl} and B˜l = 13A˜l + 13{fl} + 13{rl} for l = 0, . . . , t. Here we
have identified lotteries with their respective constant acts. Define also the mixture act
gl =
1
3
fl +
1
3
f˜l +
1
3
rl.
Linearity of SEU functionals implies
QUθk−1(Bk, gk, sk) = QUθk−1(B˜k, gk, s˜k) = QUθk−1(B˜k ∪Bk, gk, s˜k) = {(qk, uk)}.56
55The symbol unionsq means we join them into a union of disjoint sets, i.e. if a SEU (q, u) appears in the
support of two distinct θt, θ
′
t then we count it twice.
56Note that in the last equality it is irrelevant whether we write s˜k or sk because of the argument in
the first paragraph of the first step of the proof.
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We also have
M(Bk, qk, uk) = M(B˜k, qk, uk) = M(B˜k ∪Bk, qk, uk) = {gk}.
This implies that for all k = 0, . . . , t and (q′k, u
′
k) ∈ piqu
(
supp(ψ
θk−1
k−1 )
)
we have
τq′k,u′k(gk, Bk) = τq′k,u′k(gk, B˜k) = τq′k,u′k(gk, B˜k ∪Bk) =
{
1, if piqu(θk) = piqu(θ
′
k)
0, if piqu(θk) 6= piqu(θ′k).
By DR-SEU 2 of the inductive hypothesis it follows for all k = 0, . . . , t− 1 that
ψ
θt−1
t (qt, ut, st) = ρt(gt, B˜t, st|B˜0, g0, s0; . . . ; B˜t−1, gt−1, st−1)
= ρt(gt, Bt, st|B0, g0, s0, . . . , Bt−1, gt−1, st−1)
= ρt(gt, B˜t ∪Bt, st|B˜0, g0, s0, . . . , B˜k ∪Bk, gk, sk, . . . , B˜t−1 ∪Bt−1, gt−1, st−1)
= ρt(gt, B˜t ∪Bt, st|B0, g0, s0, . . . , B˜k ∪Bk, gk, sk, . . . , B˜t−1 ∪Bt−1, gt−1, st−1).
Note that in these relations we could have replaced everywhere sk with s˜k, since both are
in the support of qk by the definition of the operator QUθk−1 .
Since all the histories considered above are compatible with At+1 we apply CHI recur-
sively to get
ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|B0, g0, s0; . . . ;Bt, gt, st) = ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|B˜0 ∪B0, g0, s0; . . . ; B˜t ∪Bt, gt, st)
= ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|B˜0, g0, s0; . . . ; B˜t, gt, st).
(19)
Here st+1 ∈ St+1 is arbitrary. Use LHI and Lemma 3 (well-definiteness of the extended
aSCF) to get
ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|ht) = ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|B0, g0, s0; . . . ;Bt, gt, st),
ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|h˜t) = ρt+1(·, At+1, s˜t+1|B˜0, g0, s˜0; . . . ; B˜t, gt, s˜t).
(20)
Finally, we put (19) and (20) together to get
ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|ht) = ρt+1(·, At+1, st+1|h˜t).
This establishes the proof for the case that ht ∈ H∗t .
Step 2. Now suppose that ht 6∈ Ht∗. Take any sequence of (valid) histories ht,n ∈ Ht∗
with ht,n→mht with ht,n = (An0 , fn0 , sn0 ; . . . ;Ant , fnt , snt ) for each n. Existence is ensured by
the Axiom of History Continuity.
Claim. For all large n we have QUθk−1(A
n
k , f
n
k , s
n
k) = {piqu(θk)} for all k = 0, . . . , t.
Proof of Claim. Take some subsequence (ht,nl)l≥1 of (ht,n)n≥1. We have ρk(f
nl
k , A
nl
k , s
nl
k |hk−1,nl) >
0 for all k = 0, . . . , t by the definition of histories. Assume that by DR-SEU 2 for
k ≤ t we can find θ′t,nl ∈ Θt with pred(θ′t,nl) = (θ′0,nl , . . . , θ′t−1,nl) and (θ′0,nl , . . . , θ′t,nl) 6=
(θ0,nl , . . . , θt,nl) such that piqu(θ
′
k,nl
) ∈ QUθ′k−1,nl (f
nl
k , A
nl
k , s
nl
k ) for all k = 0, . . . , t. Since S0×
· · ·×St is finite, by choosing an appropriate subsequence we can assume (θ′0,nl , . . . , θ′t,nl) =
(θ′0, . . . , θ
′
t) 6= (θ0, . . . , θt) for all l. Pick the smallest k such that θ′k 6= θk and pick any
gk ∈ Ak. Since Anlk →mAk we can find gnlk ∈ Anlk with gnlk →mgk. Since we have for
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all l that piqu(θ
′
k) ∈ QUθ′k−1(fnlk , Anlk , snlk ), so piqu(θ′k)(fnlk ) ≥ piqu(θ′k)(gnlk ) and thus also
piqu(θ
′
k)(fk) ≥ piqu(θ′k)(gk) by linearity of the SEU represented by piqu(θ′k).
Moreover, by choice of k we have piqu(θ
′
k) ∈ piqu(supp(ψ
θ′k−1
k−1 )) = piqu(supp(ψ
θk−1
k−1 )). But
the fact that QUθk−1(fk, Ak, sk) = {piqu(θk)} implies that piqu(θ′k) = piqu(θk) for all k. We
have thus shown that each subsequence (ht,nl)l≥1 of (ht,n)n≥1 has a subsequence with the
property required by the claim. A simple argument by contradiction now establishes the
claim.
End of Proof of Claim.
The Claim establishes that for all large enough n, ht,n satisfies the assumption of the
Lemma. Since ht,n ∈ H∗t , Step 1 then shows that ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht,n) = ρθtt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1)
for all large enough n and all ft+1, st+1. History Continuity now allows to close the argu-
ment and prove that
ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht) = ρθtt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1).
As a next step we establish that ρt+1(·|ht) is a weighted average of the ρθtt+1 for θt
consistent with ht.
Lemma 9. [Pendant of Lemma 4 in [Frick, Iijima, Strzalecki ’17]] For any ft+1 ∈ At+1
and ht = (A0, f0, s0; . . . ;At, ft, st) ∈ Ht(At+1) we have
ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht) =
∑
pis(θ0,θ1,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)·ρ
θt
t+1(ft+1,At+1,st+1)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)
.
Proof. Let (θ1t , . . . , θ
m
t ) be the set of elements from Θt that are consistent with history
ht, as defined in Definition 22. For each j = 1, . . . ,m let hˆt(j) = (Bj0, f
j
0 , s0; . . . ;B
j
t , f
j
t , st)
be a separating history for θjt . Note that such a history exists because under θ
j
t and its
predecessors the ‘right’ sub-history of objective states (s0, . . . , st) has positive probability.
We can assume w.l.o.g. that for each k = 1, . . . , t in all objective states st−1 there
is a positive probability (albeit possibly small) for (z, 1
2
Ak +
1
2
Bjk) for some z. This can
be achieved by mixing with constant acts. Thus, w.l.o.g. we can ensure that ht(j) :=
1
2
ht + 1
2
hˆt(j) ∈ Ht(At+1).
Note first that it holds for all j = 1, . . . ,m
ρ(ht(j)) =
t∏
k=0
ψ
θjk−1
k (θ
j
k)τpiqu(θjk)
(fk, Ak). (21)
This follows from the following calculation.
ρ(ht(j)) =
t∏
k=0
ρk(
1
2
fk +
1
2
f jk ;
1
2
Ak +
1
2
Bjk, sk|hk(j))
=
∑
(θ′0,...,θ
′
t)
t∏
k=0
ψ
θ′k−1
k (θ
′
k)τpiqu(θ′k)(
1
2
fk +
1
2
f jk ,
1
2
Ak +
1
2
Bjk)
=
t∏
k=0
ψ
θjk−1
k (θ
j
k)τpiqu(θjk)
(
1
2
fk +
1
2
f jk ,
1
2
Ak +
1
2
Bjk)
=
t∏
k=0
ψ
θjk−1
k (θ
j
k)τpiqu(θjk)
(fk, Ak).
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Here the second equality follows from DR-SEU2 and the inductive hypothesis for
Sufficiency. The final two equalities follow from the fact that ht(j) is a separating history
for θjt (see Lemma 5). Since θ
j
t is consistent with h
t it follows
ψ
θk−1
k (θk) · τpiqu(θjk)(fk, Ak) > 0 for all k = 0, . . . , t and therefore also:
for every piqu(θ
′
k) ∈ piqu(supp(ψ
θjk−1
k )), τpiqu(θ′k)(
1
2
fk +
1
2
f jk ,
1
2
Ak +
1
2
Bk) > 0 if and only if
piqu(θ
′
k) = piqu(θ
j
k). This yields the third equality above.
Define now H t = {ht(j) : j = 1, . . . ,m} ⊂ Ht(At+1). By repeated application of LHI
we have that
ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht) = ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|H t). (22)
Moreover, we have that
ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|H t) =
∑m
j=1 ρ(h
t(j))ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht(j))∑m
j=1 ρ(h
t(j))
=
∑m
j=1
∏t
k=0 ψ
θjk−1
k (θ
j
k)τpiqu(θjk)
(fk, Ak) · ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht(j))∑m
j=1
∏t
k=0 ψ
θjk−1
k (θ
j
k)τpiqu(θjk)
(fk, Ak)
=
∑m
j=1
∏t
k=0 ψ
θjk−1
k (θ
j
k)τpiqu(θjk)
(fk, Ak)ρ
θjt
t+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1)∑m
j=1
∏t
k=0 ψ
θjk−1
k (θ
j
k)τpiqu(θjk)
(fk, Ak)
=
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak) · ρθtt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak)
.
(23)
Here the first equality holds by definition of choice conditional on a set of histories.
The second follows from (21). Note that ht(j), being a separating history for θjt and
consistent with ht, implies QUθjk
(1
2
fk +
1
2
f jk ,
1
2
Ak +
1
2
Bjk, sk) = {piqu(θjk)} for each k. Hence,
Lemma 8 implies that ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht(j)) = ρθ
j
t
t+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1). This yields the
third equality.
Finally, note that if (θ0, . . . , θt) ∈ Θ0× · · · ×Θt has (θ0, . . . , θt) 6= (θj0, . . . , θjt ) for all j,
then either θt 6∈ {θjt : j = 1, . . . ,m} or θt = θjt for some j but pred(θjt ) 6= (θ0, . . . , θt−1). In
either case we have
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak) = 0 by the inductive step up to t. This
justifies the last equality in (23).
Combining (22) and (23), we obtain the desired conclusion.
We show that our construction satisfies DR-SEU2 at step t+ 1 as well. We recall the
representation in (18) and combine it with Lemma 9 to get for any ht = (A0, f0, s0; . . . ;At, ft, st) ∈
Ht(At+1)
ρt+1(ft+1, At+1, st+1|ht) =
=
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)·
(∑
θt+1
ψ
θt
t+1(θt+1)τpiqu(θt+1)(ft+1,At+1)
)
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)
=
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt+1)=(s0,...,st+1)
∏t+1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak)
.
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D.1.2 Necessity
Suppose that ρ admits a DR-SEU representation as in Definition 20. From the represen-
tation in DR-SEU 2 and from Lemma 3 we have that for a fixed ht ∈ Ht the static aSCF
rule ρt(·|ht) satisfies the static axioms.
Claim 1. ρ satisfies CHI.
Proof. Take any ht−1 = (ht−1−k , (Ak, fk, sk)) and hˆ
t−1 = (ht−1−k , (Bk, fk, sk)) with Ak ⊆ Bk
and ρk(fk, Ak, sk|hk−1) = ρk(fk, Bk, sk|hk−1). From DR-SEU 2 this implies
∑
(θ0,...,θk)
(
k∏
l=0
ψ
θl−1
l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl, Al)
)
=
∑
(θ0,...,θk)
(
k∏
l=0
ψ
θl−1
l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl, Bl)
)
.
(24)
It follows from τpiqu(θl)(fk, Ak) ≤ τpiqu(θl)(fk, Bk) that equality in (24) can hold if and
only if τpiqu(θl)(fk, Ak) = τpiqu(θl)(fk, Bk) whenever θk is consistent with hk. This implies
immediately due to DR-SEU 2 that
ρt(·|ht−1) = ρt(·|hˆt−1).
Claim 2. ρ satisfies LHI.
Proof. Take anyAt, st and h
t−1 = (A0, f0, s0; . . . ;At−1, ft−1, st−1) ∈ Ht−1(At) andH t−1 ⊆
Ht−1(At) of the form H t−1 = {ht−1−k , (λAk + (1− λ)Bk, λfk + (1− λ)gk, sk)) : gk ∈ Bk} for
some k < t, λ ∈ (0, 1) and Bk = {gjk : j = 1, . . . ,m} ∈ Ak. Let A˜k = λAk + (1−λ)Bk and
for each j = 1, . . . ,m let f˜ jk = λfk + (1− λ)gjk and h˜t−1(j) = (ht−1−k , (A˜k, f˜ jk , sk)).
By DR-SEU 2, for all ft we have
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1) =
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
∏t
l=0 ψ
θl−1
l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl, Al)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
∏t−1
l=0 ψ
θl−1
l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl, Al)
,
and by definition also
ρt(ft, At, st|H t−1) =
∑m
j=1 ρ(h˜
t−1(j))ρt(At, ft, st|h˜t−1(j))∑m
j=1 ρ(h˜
t−1(j))
.
For each j = 1, . . . ,m DR-SEU 2 yields
ρt(ft, At, st|h˜t−1(j)) =
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
(∏t
l=0,l 6=k ψ
θl−1
l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl,Al)
)
·ψθk−1k (θk)τpiqu(θk−1)(f˜
j
k ,A˜k)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
(∏t−1
l=0,l 6=k ψ
θl−1
l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl,Al)
)
·ψθk−1k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(f˜
j
k ,A˜k)
,
as well as
ρ(h˜t−1(j)) =
t−1∏
l=0,l 6=k
ρl(fl, Al, sl|h˜l−1)ρk(f˜ jk , A˜k, sk|h˜k−1)
=
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
(
t−1∏
l=0,l 6=k
ψ
θl−1
l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl, Al)
)
· ψθk−1k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(f˜ jk , A˜k).
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We put the last three formulas together and rearrange to obtain
ρt(ft, At, st|H t−1) =
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
(∏t
l=0,l 6=k ψ
θl−1
l (θl)τpiqu(θl)(fl,Al)
)
·ψθk−1k (θk)(
∑m
j=1 τpiqu(θk)(f˜
j
k ,A˜k))∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
(∏t−1
l=0,l 6=k ψ
θl−1
l (piqu(θl))τpiqu(θl)(fl,Al)piq(θl)(sl)
)
·ψθk−1k (piqu(θk))(
∑m
j=1 τpiqu(θk)(f˜
j
k ,A˜k))piq(θk)(sk)
.
But note that for all θk ∈ Θk it holds
m∑
j=1
τpiqu(θk)(f˜
j
k , A˜k) =
m∑
j=1
τpiqu(θk)
(
(q′, u′) ∈ ∆(Sk)× RXk : f jk ∈M(M(A˜k; piqu(θk)); (q′, u′))
)
=
∑
gjk∈Bk
τpiqu(θk)
(
(q′, u′) ∈ ∆(Sk)× RXk : fk ∈M(M(Ak; piqu(θk)); (q′, u′)), gjk ∈M(M(Bk; piqu(θk)); (q′, u′))
)
= τpiqu(θk)
(
(q′, u′) ∈ ∆(Sk)× RXk : fk ∈M(M(Ak; piqu(θk)); (q′, u′))
)
= τpiqu(θk) (fk, Ak) .
By plugging this into the formula for ρt(ft, At, st|H t−1) we see that
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1) = ρt(ft, At, st|H t−1).
Claim 3. ρ satisfies History Continuity.
Proof. Fix any (ft, At, st) and h
t−1 = (f0, A0, s0; . . . ; ft−1, At−1, st−1) ∈ ht−1. Let Θt−1(ht−1) ⊆
Θt−1 denote the set of period-(t−1) states that are consistent with ht−1. Define ρθt−1t (ft, At, st) =∑
θt
ψ
θt−1
t (θt)τpiqu(θt)(ft, At). By Lemma 4 we have
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1) =
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk, Ak)
=
∑
pis(θ0,...,θt)=(s0,...,st)
∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)·
∑
θt
ψ
θt−1
t (θt)τpiqu(θt)(ft,At)∑
pis(θ0,...,θt−1)=(s0,...,st−1)
∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(fk,Ak)
.
We see that ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1) ∈ co{ρθt−1t (ft, At, st) : θt−1 ∈ Θt−1(ht−1)}. Fix any θt−1 ∈
Θt−1(ht−1). To prove the claim it suffices to show that
ρ
θt−1
t (ft, At, st) ∈ {lim
n
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1n ) : ht−1n →mht−1, ht−1n ∈ H∗t−1}.
To this end, let pred(θt−1) = (θ0, . . . , θt−2) and let h¯t−1 = (B0, g0, s0; . . . ;Bt−1, gt−1, st−1) ∈
H∗t−1 be a separating history for θt−1. By Lemma 6 for each k = 0, . . . , t− 1 we can find
sequences Ank ∈ A∗k(h¯k−1) and fnk ∈ Ank with fnk→mfk and QUθk−1(Ank , fnk , sk) = {piqu(θk)}
for all n and all k = 0, . . . , t − 1. Working backwards from k = t− 2 we can inductively
replace Ank and f
n
k with a mixture putting small weight on a constant act yielding (z, A
n
k+1)
for some z so as to ensure that Ank+1 ∈ suppA(fnk (sk)), irrespective of sk ∈ Sk. This can
be done maintaining the previous properties of Ank and f
n
k .
By construction it follows ht−1n = (A
n
0 , f
n
0 , s0; . . . ;A
n
t−1, f
n
t−1, st−1) ∈ H∗t−1(At) and this
is also a separating history for θt−1.
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By Lemma 4 the latter fact implies for each n that
ρt(ft, At, st|ht−1n )
=
∑
θt
(∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(f
n
k , A
n
k)
)
· ψθt−1t (θt)τpiqu(θt)(ft, At)∏t−1
k=0 ψ
θk−1
k (θk)τpiqu(θk)(f
n
k , A
n
k)
=
∑
θt
ψ
θt−1
t (θt)τθt(ft, At)
= ρ
θt−1
t (ft, At, st).
The desired claim follows since ht−1n →mht−1.
D.2 Proofs for the Comparative Statics part
D.2.1 Proof of Proposition 5
This is a trivial application of Lemma 24 in the online appendix.
D.2.2 Proof of Proposition 6
This is a direct implication of the Proof of the Representation Theorems for Evolving
SEU and Gradual Learning (Theorems 2 and 3 in the main body of the paper) as well as
Theorem 1 in [Dillenberger et al ’14].
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